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Abstract
Glavan, Joseph. M.S., Department of Psychology, Wright State University, 2017.
Exploration of the Time-Based Resource-Sharing Model of Working Memory Through
Computational Modeling.

Working memory is the fundamental component of cognition that allows us to
temporarily maintain information needed for concurrent processing. An existing
theory from the literature, the time-based resource-sharing (TBRS) model, posits
that working memory is a serial, rapidly switching, attentional refreshing mechanism.
While others have sought previously to formalize the TBRS model into a computational
process model, I go further, using ACT-R to model the influence of working memory
on an entire task from end to end. I leverage ACT-R’s existing base-level learning
mechanism, typically used to model recency and frequency effects in long-term memory,
to enact the attentional refreshing and temporal decay central to TBRS. I also use
a novel combination of existing inhibition and association theories to implement a
functional list representation. The model replicates trends in human memory spans
and response times across six experimental conditions from a previously published
study. These efforts reveal that areas not traditionally associated with working
memory research directly, particularly item representation and response strategy, are
necessary assumptions of any such process model despite being underspecified in
TBRS and other theories. I discuss future experiments to further constrain these
ancillary assumptions and conclude by proposing various directions for expanding
the model in subsequent work.
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Introduction

Working memory (WM) may be the paramount element of cognition. Drawing
its name from the analogy of the mind as a computer, its significance has been
recognized from the very beginning of the cognitive revolution (Miller, 1956). Just
as random-access memory (RAM) is vital to the efficient operation of a computer
system, it has been argued that a similar kind of immediately accessible memory
or workspace is necessary for a cognitive system to function. Working memory has
received considerable additional attention in the cognitive psychology literature lately
for its strength as a predictor of general fluid intelligence (Chow & Conway, 2015;
Conway et al., 2005). Just as intelligence can vary widely across people, individual
differences are also commonly observed in measures of WM. Latent variable analyses
repeatedly demonstrate covariance between these two constructs as high as .60 (Conway,
Cowan, Bunting, Therriault, & Minkoff, 2002).
Working memory is defined as the ability to temporarily maintain representations
of information relevant to the immediate environment or necessary for the accomplishment
of goals (Baddeley & Logie, 1999). It is commonly thought of as a short-term storage
for intermediate processing results, like the sums and products in an algebra problem
(Anderson, 2005). It may also serve as a buffer for the storage and retrieval of
information from long-term memory (LTM; Atkinson & Shiffrin, 1968; Baddeley,
2000). Whereas information held in LTM is relatively permanent with respect to
time, WM is temporary, retaining information on the magnitude of seconds. The
name short-term memory (STM) can also be used to describe any such nonpermanent
1

information, but the term WM is generally reserved for only those mnemonic tasks
that involve a concurrent processing activity (Diamond, 2013). It will be fundamental
to this thesis however that recall never takes place in a vacuum: all mnemonic
activity, whether in or out of the laboratory, proceeds under some degree of concurrent
processing demand (i.e. cognitive load; Barrouillet, Bernardin, & Camos, 2004). For
this reason, any such division between WM and STM may be a false dichotomy. I
will introduce a model that advocates for such a WM/STM spectrum.
With its roots in the cognitive revolution as well, computational process modeling
has grown in popularity as a tool for formally specifying theories. Computational
process models go beyond verbal theories by instantiating the theory as a set of
algorithms. By specifying the process in computer code, it quickly becomes apparent
when hidden assumptions have been overlooked because the simulation simply will
not run. Additionally, there is no ambiguity in computer code like there is in written
language. This benefit has been used to unite related cognitive theories and classes of
models into cognitive architectures, overarching systems of shared assumptions derived
from empirical work and organized into compatible libraries of computer programs.
One such cognitive architecture, Adaptive Control of Thought – Rational (ACT-R;
Anderson, 2007; Anderson et al., 2004) will be a focus of this thesis.
Computational process modeling provides a stricter method for composing
cognitive theories and allows for directly testing the theories because the models are
computer programs capable of execution and generation of simulated data. Hypotheses
are built into a model and one determines if the effects observed in human data can
actually be produced by the assumptions of the model. This approach is even more
useful in research situations where there is more than one plausible mechanism
proposed to explain the data. Computational modeling can be used to pit these
hypotheses against each other, head-to-head, while holding everything else constant.
2

Beyond which model explains the observed human data better, modeling can even be
used to ascertain where indistinguishable theories diverge. Through simulation, it is
possible to determine the full range of results a model is capable of producing, and
the conditions where such theories no longer overlap spotlight the critical experiment
that should be conducted next.
The greatest advantage of computational cognitive modeling, in addition to
those outlined above, is that it does not require closed-form solutions, unlike other
styles of mathematical modeling and verbal theorizing. Behaviors arising from many
complex and dynamic interactions can be chaotic and impossible to fully predict
with these models but not for computational ones. These types of phenomena are
fully exemplified by real-world behavior, and understanding the behavior of everyday
people in the real world is the ultimate goal of psychology. Therefore computational
process models are crucial if we are to understand how the mechanisms underlying
WM regulate human interactions with the environment in real-life situations. In this
thesis, I divulge the development of such a model, capable of performing every aspect
of a WM task, not just the memory component. It builds upon an existing framework
for end-to-end process modeling, laying the foundation for future application to other
areas of research. I will discuss how it integrates multiple elements from contemporary
theories of WM, STM, and LTM; specifically, the areas of executive control, serial
memory, and episodic memory. This effort reveals that WM may not be a simple
buffer for storage, as in the RAM analogy, but an active process susceptible to the
strains of competing attentional demands.

1.1

Working Memory Capacity
The standard quantification associated with WM is its capacity (WMC), the

amount of information maintained over a given period of time and under a given
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cognitive load. Chow and Conway (2015) outline three unique sources of variance
that contribute to individual differences in WMC, the first being the number of items
able to be kept active simultaneously within the focus of attention. Cowan (2001)
suggests this “pure capacity” to be around four items. In addition to the raw number
of items simultaneously maintained, the quality, or resolution, of these items may
be used to characterize WMC; however, the distinctiveness of its contribution to
fluid intelligence remains unresolved (Chow & Conway, 2015; Fukuda, Vogel, Mayr,
& Awh, 2010). Beyond the scope of attention, the top-down control of attention
provides another source of variance in WMC. Reflecting one’s ability to disregard
distractions, to concentrate on goal-relevant information, and to efficiently divert
focus between tasks; this construct connects WMC with domain-general everyday
cognition (see Conway et al. (2005) for a review of references to studies ranging from
high-level activities such as reading, reasoning, and learning to low-level behaviors
such as exogenous attentional capture and proactive interference).
The third operationalization of WMC, successful control of attention, is frequently
measured using the complex span paradigm. In a complex span task, to-be-remembered
items (denoted as “targets”) are presented in alternation with some number of
“distractors.” Subjects are instructed to remember the targets while processing
the distractors until they are prompted to recall the targets, often in the correct
order and sometimes with the option to skip serial positions for which they cannot
recall the correct target. Typically this routine is repeated with progressively more
target-distractor series until the subject fails to meet some recall criterion, such as
correctly recalling some percentage of the list. For example, in the reading span task
(Daneman & Carpenter, 1980), subjects are presented with a series of n sentences, which
they are instructed to read aloud, memorizing the final word of each sentence. After the
series has been presented, subjects are prompted to recall the list of final words. If they
continue to meet criterion, a series with n + 1 sentences is presented. Other popular
4

complex span tasks include the operation span task (Turner & Engle, 1989), where
subjects are required to evaluate arithmetic expressions between memorizing targets,
and the counting span task (Case, Kurland, & Goldberg, 1982), where subjects count
the number of objects in a display and then memorize the tally. The score obtained
from a complex span task, indicative of the subject’s WMC, is called a memory “span,”
and may be calculated in various ways, depending on how the experimenter wishes
to treat the completeness, order, etc. of recall. It is often the average length of each
target-distractor series the subject completed. Based on a meta-analysis of Kane et al.
(2004), Conway et al. (2005) recommend using partial-credit scoring, where the score
of a particular series is the percentage of that series correctly recalled, as opposed to
all-or-nothing scoring. They demonstrate that, while both are still relatively high,
the partial-credit scoring method exhibits greater within-task consistency. Because
all-or-nothing scoring is a more coarse measure, it necessarily will exhibit greater
within-individual variance, meaning the same person may score differently upon
repeated administrations of the complex span task.
The quick pace and attentional demand of the distractors in a complex span task
are intended to interfere with the subject’s ability to employ a number of memory-aiding
cognitive strategies (e.g. mnemonics, grouping/chunking, mental imagery, etc.).
Ideally, the intense cognitive load of these tasks (e.g., sentence comprehension, equation
solving, counting, etc.) entirely prevents any rehearsal from taking place, allowing
the experimenter to measure the raw amount of information that survives from
encoding to probed recall. However, because the traditional complex span task is
self-paced, subjects, deliberately or not, may adapt to the load by pausing slightly
before responding (Barrouillet et al., 2004). During such pauses they can engage
in covert maintenance processes (Cowan, 1992; Cowan et al., 1994), inflating their
effective WMC. Barrouillet et al. (2004) recognized that it may be impossible to
experimentally eliminate all covert rehearsals in a traditional complex span task
5

because of variance in individuals’ processing abilities. To remedy this, they proposed
reducing the complexity of processing demanded by distractors (e.g. from equation
solving to single-digit addition or from sentence comprehension to single-symbol
articulation) and strictly controlling the onset and offset of targets and distractors.
While the time available for maintenance cannot be eliminated, if the number of
processing steps (e.g. retrievals) for a given distractor can be determined, then this
time can at least be controlled. I refer to this general paradigm as continuous span
tasks, adapted from the name Barrouillet et al. (2004) give to their second experiment
(continuous operation span task).

1.2

Existing Models of Working Memory
Probably the most influential model of WM is the multicomponent model

(Baddeley, 1986; Baddeley & Hitch, 1974; Baddeley & Logie, 1999). Baddeley and Hitch
(1974) conducted a series of experiments where subjects were required to memorize a
list of digits and then complete a verbal reasoning task. They observed that the size
of the memory load had little effect on accuracy in the reasoning task while increasing
response times. They also observed greater interference when the memory items
were phonologically similar to the reasoning items, although concurrent articulatory
suppression only had a minor effect on reasoning times. They concluded that while
verbal reasoning must share some resources with STM, the sharing is likely limited
to the degree of overlap between representations in the two tasks because they failed
to find the sort of catastrophic interference they expected a single capacity model to
predict. Accordingly, they proposed a model in which processing and maintenance are
handled by two separate but interconnected systems. The phonological loop, operating
on a verbal code, implements storage through articulatory rehearsal of items. This slave
system is managed by a central executive system, which is responsible for processing.
While supervision of the phonological loop is necessary for coordinating storage, it does
6

not exhaustively tax the central executive, explaining the relatively minor interference
observed by Baddeley and Hitch (1974). Further work on the multicomponent model
has emphasized dissociation between verbal STM and visuospatial STM, leading to
the addition of another slave system to the model, the visuospatial sketchpad.
Contemporary to the multicomponent model is a capacity-sharing model. The
trade-off model of WM (Case et al., 1982) posits the existence of a singular pool of
strictly limited resources called M space. This resource space is required for both
processing and storage. Case et al. (1982) used a counting span task to assess the
size of subjects’ M spaces, where subjects had to count the green dots (amongst
distractors) on a series of cards and remember the sequence of counts. In adults, they
manipulated counting speed by forcing one group to count using a pseudo number
scheme. They observed a linear relationship between working memory span and
counting speed and concluded that the slower counting speed in the pseudo number
condition reflected worse processing efficiency than with normal numbers. This less
efficient processing required more space in M space, which left less space available for
storage and caused lower spans to be observed. Likewise, phonologically similar items
require more resources to distinguish them from each other and cause lower spans.
Towse and Hitch (1995) interpreted Case et al.’s results differently. They argued
that slower counting caused lower spans not because this inefficient processing stole
additional resources (relative to the normal numbers condition) away from storage
activities but because of temporal decay. They proposed that subjects switch between
storage tasks and processing tasks and that while subjects are performing processing
tasks, memory items decay as a function of time. Slower counting speeds contribute
to longer periods between storage activities, thus allowing more decay to take place.
Towse and Hitch evaluated this hypothesis using an alternative manipulation to the
counting span task. In one condition of the task, the first card in the sequence took a
7

long time to count while the last card could be counted (relatively) quickly. In the
second condition, the sequence was flipped so that the first card took less time to
count and the last card took more time to count. Because storage is not required
until after the first card has been counted, the two conditions have distinctly different
retention periods but equal overall difficulty. Working memory spans were observed
to negatively correlate with retention period length, and because the same series of
cards were used in both conditions (only the order was manipulated), the authors
concluded that temporal decay, not limited processing resources, was responsible for
limited working memory capacity. These results were later found in other complex
span tasks (e.g., reading span, operation span; Towse, Hitch, & Hutton, 1998) and
taken as further evidence for the task-switching model.
The capacity-sharing hypothesis did not disappear with the rise of the task-switching
model. Anderson, Reder, and Lebiere (1996) proposed an addition to the ACT-R
theory, applying findings from research on the fan effect (Anderson, 1976; Pirolli &
Anderson, 1985) to WM. According to the fan effect, the more items a cue is associated
with, the less reliable it is at predicting any of them. In this same way, they argued
that activation from a given context must be divided among all the items in the
context. Contexts with fewer elements are able to spread more activation to each
item, making them more accessible. Anderson et al. (1996) conducted an experiment
where subjects had to memorize a list of digits and then solve algebra problems. In
some of the experimental conditions, subjects were required to substitute one or two
of the digits from the list into the algebra problem. They found effects of the number
of symbols in the equations and the length of the memorized list. A single capacity
model, which modeled the activation of an item as 1/(d + s), where d is the number
of symbols in the equation and s is the number of items in the list, fit the human
data better than a separate capacity model, which modeled the activation of equation
elements as 1/d and the activation of list items as 1/s. Interestingly, their model
8

did not utilize temporal decay or rehearsal, significant components of later ACT-R
models.
More recently, Barrouillet and Camos (2001), in addition to describing various
other possible confounds in Towse and Hitch’s (1995) counting span task, pointed out a
significant flaw in the task-switching conclusion. While it is true that retention periods
are different in each condition because storage activities do not begin until after the
first card has been counted, the cognitive load concurrent with the retention period is
also different because it too does not begin until after the first card has been counted.
Thus Towse and Hitch (1995) may not have truly ruled out the trade-off model
and other resource-sharing accounts of working memory. To better control temporal
dynamics so as to better study the effects of processing difficulty on working memory
performance, Barrouillet et al. (2004) introduced the aforementioned continuous span
paradigm, which contributed substantially to the development of their model.
The time-based resource-sharing (TBRS) model of WM (Barrouillet et al., 2004;
Barrouillet, Bernardin, Portrat, Vergauwe, & Camos, 2007) was introduced to account
for the shortcomings of limited resource trade-off models (Case et al., 1982) and
task-switching models (Towse & Hitch, 1995) when task time and difficulty are tightly
controlled. It is a member of a class of models that assume a central bottleneck
(Pashler, 1984). The TBRS model proposes that active maintenance of items is
achieved through rapid, and possibly covert, switching of attention between processing
and maintenance. The major claim of TBRS is that the ratio of time devoted to
maintenance relative to the time spent processing is the main factor responsible for
determining the amount of information able to be retained, rather than the raw time
allocated to either alone. Contrary to trade-off models, which suggest task difficulty
constrains WMC, or other capacity-sharing models (Anderson et al., 1996), which
suggest the number of items to be retained directly limit WMC, TBRS predicts
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that (potentially vastly different) tasks with varying levels of difficulty or number
of elements can produce equal WM spans if they are equated in processing time
relative to the total time of the task (Barrouillet et al., 2007). Likewise, the time
between targets, the hypothesized determinant of task-switching models, was shown
by Barrouillet et al. (2004) to only affect WM spans when total task time was kept
constant; when the ratio of the two is controlled, this effect disappears. The conclusion
of the TBRS theory, that limited attentional resources are shared on a temporal,
rather than global, basis (hence the name time-based resource-sharing), reveals that
WM is a dynamic sequence of items trading their time in the focus of attention rather
than the static partitioning of a limited capacity space.
Unlike task-switching models (e.g., Towse & Hitch, 1995; Towse et al., 1998),
which only allow maintenance to take place between sets of distractors, the TBRS
model allows maintenance to take place whenever the central bottleneck is free. This
includes delay intervals, within sets of distractors, and even during the processing
of a distractor if it is waiting on peripheral systems (Barrouillet & Camos, 2015).
Refreshing, retrieval, and other sources of attentional capture are not instantaneous;
they take time to fulfill. Although maintenance can only be executed serially due to
the central bottleneck, temporal decay affects all memory traces simultaneously. This
exchange of rates ensures that only a limited number of items may be kept accessible
by the cognitive system, a hallmark of WM.
Oberauer and Lewandowsky (2011), themselves critics of some of TBRS’s base
assumptions, developed a connectionist model, TBRS*, to evaluate whether such a
rapidly switching serial mechanism could produce the observed effects on WM span.
Their model borrows heavily from Burgess and Hitch (2006; discussed in more detail
in the next section) and refreshes targets by strengthening associations between items
and positional markers (represented as a group of nodes) through Hebbian learning
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until some criterion strength is achieved or maintenance is interrupted by a processing
episode.
Although TBRS* successfully reproduces the effects predicted by the verbal
TBRS theory and observed in empirical studies, yielding proof-of-concept support for
time-based resource-sharing, it suffers from one significant defect. TBRS* does not
fully model the processing of distractors; rather it samples a random duration from
the distribution of response times determined post-hoc by experimental observations.
Refreshing targets is then delayed for the interval sampled. A comprehensive model
of WM should not abstract away distractor processing when the critical aspect of
the TBRS theory is that the interaction of maintenance and processing is what
affects WMC. Particularly when studying real-world tasks where processing is more
complex and more variable, it is paramount that we have an integrated model of
WM that is able to fully simulate the person-environment system. My model does
this, conducting simultaneous maintenance of targets and processing of distractors to
predict all measures of performance.

1.3

Connection to Serial Memory
In many WM experiments, including the continuous span task I use to validate my

model, subjects are required to recall the targets presented and in the order in which
they are presented. Thus, WM is not responsible for merely maintaining multiple
items individually but as a list of items. List memory, or serial memory, is its own area
of study and seemingly overlooked in theories of WM (cf. Farrell, 2012). However, as
noted by Oberauer and Lewandowsky (2011) when developing TBRS*, computational
process modeling makes apparent the need to explicitly specify the representation
of items and how their order is encoded. To satisfy this requisite, I next provide an
overview of contemporary theories and models of serial recall.
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Three techniques for encoding order in list or serial memory are commonly
considered in the literature: positional coding, primacy gradients, and chaining. With
positional coding, an item is tagged with its ordinal position (e.g., first, second, third,
etc.) when it is first encoded at the time of presentation. The cognitive system then
loops through the ordinal tags, using them as cues for retrieving the associated target.
Similarity gradients or random noise can be used to introduce positional errors in
recall. This is the approach taken by Burgess and Hitch (2006; and therefore Oberauer
and Lewandowsky, 2011) as well as Huss and Byrne’s (2003) ACT-R model of the
phonological loop (likely following the example of Anderson et al., 1998). Primacy
gradient models (e.g., Farrell, 2012; Page & Norris, 1998) assume some decreasing
function of activation across list items, which may originate from association with
the beginning of the list or derived from the number of items already in the list at
the time of encoding. The item with the highest activation is retrieved, and to avoid
repeatedly retrieving the same item, already retrieved items are suppressed until the
full list has been iterated. Chaining models (e.g., Kieras, Meyer, Mueller, & Seymour,
1999; Lewandowsky & Murdock, 1989; Solway, Murdock, & Kahana, 2012) assume
that adjacent items in a series are directly associated with each other, akin to a linked
list in computer science. Retrieval of one item cues retrieval of the next item, and list
structure emerges from local, inter-item connections rather than from assuming some
global order.
While each of the methods for encoding order introduced above has their merits,
none are without a fatal flaw. Positional coding can be argued to simply move the
problem of order from items to positions. In order to know which position with
which to encode a new item, the total number of items currently in the list must
be maintained in addition to the list itself. The list could instead be iterated (read:
rehearsed in full) when a new item is presented to determine its appropriate position
for encoding, but this would require a significant amount of time, during which the
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new item would still need to be stored somewhere. Additionally, if an item’s position is
used as the cue to retrieve the next position in the list, then positional coding reduces
to chaining. Furthermore, because the positions are chained rather than the items
themselves, additional retrievals must be made to get the item from its positional
code.
Primacy models may face criticism for using the well-known primacy effect
observed in serial recall data as a fundamental assumption rather than a product of
its mechanisms. The nature of its suppression mechanism is also underspecified —
why does such a mechanism know to relinquish its suppression only after rehearsing
the final item of the list, which may change throughout the experiment? Oberauer
and Lewandowsky (2011: Appendix A) provide an analysis of the shortcomings of
primacy models in the context of a TBRS model. Primacy models reconstruct their
activation gradient as items are rehearsed and require rehearsing the full list before
the old gradient is updated. Partial list rehearsals, which the TBRS theory proposes
to take place during brief pauses in processing, cause uneven allocations of activation
across the list, polluting the gradient and contaminating the encoded order. Moreover,
the distractor items in a complex span task are intended to interrupt maintenance
activities, making it very unlikely that there will be an idle interval long enough to
rehearse the list in its entirety (Oberauer & Lewandowsky, 2011).
Simple chaining models suffer the most obvious faults: like any chain, they are
only as strong as their weakest link. If the model fails to retrieve an item, then it has
no cue with which to retrieve the next item. The remaining items that follow in the
list may still have activation and so may not be lost from memory per se, but they
have become disconnected from the list and thus are no longer accessible, at least for
this iteration. The next rehearsal loop through the list may successfully retrieve the
previously failed item, but the items that follow did not get rehearsed previously and
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now may have decayed out of memory. Lists that allow repeated items may also cause
trouble for chaining models because these items would become linked to multiple
items, making the correct next item ambiguous. Models that allow associations among
more than two items (becoming more like a network than a simple chain) and/or
unique identities for each item can overcome these challenges; however, such models
may still have difficulty accounting for various error patterns in serial recall (Henson,
Norris, Page, & Baddeley, 1996).
Burgess and Hitch’s (2006) connectionist model of serial recall, which Oberauer
and Lewandowsky (2011) adopt as their engine for serial representation in TBRS*,
uses positional coding. It sidesteps the problem of positional order by presupposing a
continuously changing context signal instantiated by a population of nodes, possibly
realized by neurons acting as temporal oscillators (Brown, Preece, & Hulme, 2000).
When items are first encoded, their association to the context signal is strengthened.
Rehearsal and recall are achieved by replaying the context signal, like a film, and
retrieving the item most highly activated by the reestablished context signal. Under
this framing, it is the association of an item with its position that is maintained, not
the item itself. This idea reflects the binding hypothesis (Oberauer et al., 2007) of
WM: items are not directly lost from memory; rather they lose their binding to the
correct retrieval cue. I have not found a source that satisfactorily explains how the
context signal is maintained so that it can be reinstated at a later time.
Anderson et al.’s (1998) model of list memory utilizes an alternative to Burgess
and Hitch’s conceptualization of positional coding that circumvents the problems
previously described. Their ACT-R model directly encodes items with their ordinal
position, which is justified because of the paradigm they chose to use. In their
immediate serial recall experiments, subjects are visually presented with a number
of boxes equal to the number of items in the upcoming list. Each item is presented
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one at a time in its respective box. During recall, the cursor moves between boxes as
the subject enters their responses. Because the boxes are always present on screen,
subjects are heavily biased toward associating each item with its respective spatial
location. However, this is not the case in typical complex span tasks where items
are presented more temporally disparate and in the same location. For this reason,
Anderson et al.’s method of positional coding may not generalize conclusively to all
instances of serial recall.
More recently, researchers have begun to consider whether items are encoded
with their temporal position in the experiment rather than with their ordinal position
in the list. Unsworth and Engle (2006) propose that one of the factors contributing
to individual differences in complex span task performance is subjects’ ability to
effectively use temporal-context as a cue for retrieval. They argue that while other
cues (e.g., semantic, phonological, etc.) may facilitate rehearsal, complex span tasks
are inherently episodic memory tasks, and the only statistically meaningful cue for
an item in such a task is the temporal context in which it is encoded. They support
their argument with error patterns in reading span and operation span tasks; however,
their analysis is based on the classic interpretation of a complex span task — that
it is simply an immediate serial recall task modified to prevent all rehearsal. They
apply their account of temporal-contextual cues to retrieval at recall only; they do not
consider any intra-task refreshing or rehearsal, covert or otherwise. This is problematic
because their complex span tasks are self-paced, which allows the subject to insert
pauses for rehearsal while processing the distractor task. For these reasons, their
results alone may not be enough to substantiate their conclusions.
Fortunately, further support for temporal-contextual associations encoding target
order can be found elsewhere in the literature. Looking at simple serial recall research,
recall of target items tends to cluster around their correct position when all responses
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are taken into account (Estes, 1972). This finding is commonly attributed to positional
coding of items; however, such an evaluation confounds the temporal position of items,
as recalled items also tend to cluster around the position of the previously recalled
item (Solway et al., 2012). Recalling an item in its correct position necessarily implies
that it is recalled in the next position from the previously (correctly) recalled item.
Conditioning their analyses on the item recalled after a first-order transposition error,
Solway et al. (2012) found that anticipation errors, recalling an item in an earlier
position, were most commonly followed by another anticipation error — most often
the item that follows the transposed item. They showed that a forward chaining
model better supported their results than Burgess and Hitch’s (2006) positional
coding model. Contrasting these findings, Farrell, Hurlstone, and Lewandowsky (2013)
repeated Solway et al.’s (2012) analyses on 19 other previously conducted serial recall
experiments and found that anticipation errors were more often followed by filling-in
the skipped over item rather than consecutive anticipation errors. They note a number
of differences in the ways the analyzed studies were conducted, any of which may
explain the discrepancy in conclusions. Solway et al. (2012) examined studies where
subjects learned much longer lists over multiple trials and were allowed to skip items.
Unlike Farrell et al.’s (2013) reviewed studies, which used letters and digits as the
targets, they used words as the to-be-remembered items, which may be more readily
formed into phrases, an inherently chain-like structure. Farrell et al.’s (2013) findings
are more applicable to complex span studies because they use similar list-lengths and
instructions. More convincingly, they showed that Farrell’s (2012) model of short-term
and episodic memory is able to reproduce the results from both papers, as well as
intermediate studies.
Farrell’s (2012) model is driven by the notion that humans constantly parse their
continuous experiences into temporally related, discrete episodes. Applied to serial
recall tasks, it assumes that subjects spontaneously group proximate items into subsets.
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These subsets are cued by a temporal context — similar to Unsworth and Engle’s
(2006) account — and once retrieved can be used to access their constituent elements.
Relative association to the first and last items in the subset encodes the order of items
within a subset using a primacy gradient. This relative association may be derived
from neurally-instantiated temporal oscillators (Brown et al., 2000). The temporal
grouping model has been shown to account for a variety of findings common to simple
span tasks and provides a unified theory of immediate free recall performance and
immediate serial recall performance (Farrell, 2012; Spurgeon, Ward, Matthews, &
Farrell, 2015). Interestingly, Farrell (2012) modeled the data from Unsworth and Engle
(2006) and found that lower WMC could be explained by an increased likelihood to
form smaller subsets, the errors in recall arising from more opportunities to retrieve
the wrong group context.
Stepping back, it appears that an interesting cycle of conflict has emerged: Solway
et al. (2012) suggest that chaining models produce temporal-grouping effects that
positional models cannot, Farrell et al. (2013) demonstrate that a primacy gradient
model is superior to chaining models, and Oberauer and Lewandowsky (2011) argue
that a primacy gradient cannot be used to model TBRS but positional coding can be.
To rectify this impasse, I propose a compromise that borrows from each approach and
is explained in detail in the model description section. In brief, my model will encode
each item with the temporal context during which they are presented and then use
associative chaining between these encoded contexts to retrieve one item after another.
Other mechanisms will produce effects similar to primacy and suppression.

1.4

Time-Based Resource-Sharing
Since the work of Barrouillet and Camos (2001), Barrouillet et al. (2004), and

Barrouillet et al. (2007) refuted pure capacity-sharing models (e.g. Case et al., 1982)
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and pure decay-based models (e.g. Towse & Hitch, 1995), TBRS has become a
leading model of WM. With its expansion into domain-specific investigations of verbal
and visuospatial WM, TBRS is stronger and as comprehensive as the well-known
multicomponent model (Baddeley, 2000, 2012; Baddeley & Hitch, 1974; Camos &
Barrouillet, 2014). For these reasons, I use TBRS as the core of my model.
TBRS is derived from three key assumptions (Barrouillet et al., 2004, 2007;
Barrouillet & Camos, 2015). The first assumption is that both processing and
maintenance require the same limited resource: attention. The second assumption
is the existence of a central bottleneck or limited focus of attention. Only one item
may occupy the central bottleneck at any given time. The third assumption is an
interaction between active refreshing and passive decay. The memory trace of an
item receives activation when it is brought into the focus of attention; meanwhile,
the memory traces of all items not currently being refreshed experience temporal
decay. The process of active maintenance may be explicit (e.g. articulatory rehearsal)
or implicit (e.g., covert retrieval, attentional refreshing). The need to continuously
refresh memory traces in order to prevent their loss by decay, when coupled with the
limitations of a central bottleneck, implies that the working memory system includes
a serially rapid-switching mechanism, constantly switching between processing and
maintenance to balance the temporal needs of each.

1.4.1

Predictions of TBRS

Further study of the TBRS model’s specification yields a strong, quantifiable,
prediction of working memory capacity. The odds that an item is still accessible at
some point later are directly related to the amount of retention time spent in the focus
of attention. Observable WMC is therefore a function of the collective time available
for maintenance activities. Tasks that require executive control obstruct the central
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bottleneck, reducing the time available for maintenance during the task period and
placing a hard constraint called “cognitive load” on task-dependent WMC. When this
obstruction time is decomposed into individual processing events, cognitive load can
be formulated as
PN

i=1

CL =

ai

T

(1.1)

where ai reflects the latency of the ith process and T is the total task time (Barrouillet
et al., 2004). If the number of processes N is known, or controlled as it is in a
continuous span task, Equation 1.1 can be simplified by using mean processing times:

CL =

āN
T

(1.2)

Note that cognitive load is a dimensionless ratio of times ranging from 0 to 1. Using
response times as approximations of processing times and using Equation 1.2, WMC
has repeatedly been observed as a linear function of cognitive load (Barrouillet et al.,
2004, 2007; Barrouillet, Portrat, & Camos, 2011):

S = k(1 − CL)

(1.3)

where S is the empirically observed span, CL is cognitive load, and k is the participant’s
raw capacity that may vary based on qualities of the memory targets (e.g., word
length, frequency, etc.). The parameter k is also the capacity of an individual that
hypothetically would be observed when there is no cognitive load present (i.e. all
executive processes serving maintenance). Such a situation might be considered an
ideal simple span task (i.e. in the absence of higher-level retrieval strategies like
chunking, narrative production, etc.). Furthermore, recognizing that T also can be

19

blocked into N bins, Equation 1.2 becomes

CL =

āN
ā
=
τN
τ

(1.4)

the proportion of time spent processing to time available for processing. Rearranging
and substituting into Equation 1.3 yields
S ā
+ =1
k τ

(1.5)

where 0 < k; 0 ≤ S ≤ k; 0 < τ ; 0 ≤ ā ≤ τ

Equation 1.5 expresses a perfect, time-based, limited resource trade-off: the proportion
of WMC available for maintenance and the proportion of time necessary to process
the concurrent cognitive load must sum to one.
Continuous span tasks have been used to factorially manipulate the individual
components of cognitive load (Equation 1.2), and appropriate trends in span have
been observed that simultaneously violate predictions of trade-off and task switching
models while supporting predictions of the TBRS model (Barrouillet et al., 2004,
2007). A meta-analysis of 14 different experimental conditions (Barrouillet et al., 2007;
Barrouillet, Portrat, & Camos, 2011) involving a variety of executive processes such as
updating, inhibition, response selection, and retrieval found that Equation 1.3 accounts
for an impressive 98% of the variance observed in span scores. Interestingly, the k
parameter, the raw WMC, is commonly found to be around just over 8, well within
Miller’s (1956) magical number (7 ± 2). These strong empirical confirmations of the
model’s quantitative predictions provide strong evidence for time-based resource-sharing.
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1.4.2

Further Investigations of TBRS Assumptions

The predictions of the TBRS model are well supported, which is why the most
recent research has focused on its premises. The first assumption, that processing and
maintenance share a common resource, has received the most attention. Vergauwe,
Barrouillet, and Camos (2010) showed that verbal and visuospatial processes, which
the multicomponent model (Baddeley & Hitch, 1974) assumed to rely on separate
resources (Baddeley & Logie, 1999) or separate systems (Baddeley, 2000), can still
interfere with each other as if sharing a limited resource if temporal factors are carefully
controlled using a continuous span task. However, verbal processing interfered even
more with verbal storage than can be attributed to domain-general resource sharing,
suggesting that there may exist an additional system contributing to verbal capacity
(such as the multicomponent model’s phonological loop; Barrouillet & Camos, 2010;
Vergauwe et al., 2010). Further investigations (Camos, Mora, & Barrouillet, 2013; Mora
& Camos, 2013) found that effects such as phonological similarity and word length
only affect this additional capacity for verbal information. The portion of interference
from domain-general executive processes did not vary across tasks, suggesting these
attentional and non-attentional systems are separate. Camos, Mora, and Oberauer
(2011) have even shown that humans can adaptively favor one system over the other
depending on the attentional and phonological demands of the concurrent task. As
the TBRS model has grown to accommodate these separate systems, Camos and
Barrouillet (2014, see also Barrouillet & Camos, 2015) have found it increasingly useful
to discuss TBRS in the terms of a cognitive architecture. While useful for organizing
a growing theory, no such architecture has yet been computationally implemented.
My model is the first step in this direction.
The second assumption of TBRS, that attention is applied within the limited
scope of a bottleneck, and its implication that refreshing is a serial process has also
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been challenged. Portrat and Lemaire (2014) used TBRS* (Oberauer & Lewandowsky,
2011), to simulate data from Barrouillet et al. (2007). They found that the switching
rate required for the model to fit the unpublished serial position curves of the data
was 10 ms, a speed they noted was implausibly short. They further demonstrated
how TBRS* with a more reasonable switching rate but focus size of one item cannot
produce a recency effect on the last item of a serial position curve because the last item
does not get refreshed frequently enough. When the focus of attention was increased
to simultaneously hold up to four items it had the dual benefits of reintroducing
the recency effect and bringing the best-fitting switching rate up to 80 ms. That
being said, it is worth noting that TBRS* uses a different list representation and
refreshing scheme than my model will use, and it remains to be seen whether Portrat
and Lemaire’s conclusions are specific to TBRS* or applicable to TBRS in general.
The third assumption of TBRS, that memory traces decay as a function of
time, is at odds with another hypothesis in the literature. Representation-based
interference (Lewandowsky & Oberauer, 2009) proposes that processing a piece of
information immediately weakens the memory traces of previously stored information
because of interference between the items’ episodic representations. Barrouillet,
Portrat, Vergauwe, Diependaele, and Camos (2011) demonstrated that there is little
evidence for representation-based interference when temporal factors are carefully
controlled. Interference affects representations with greater variation equally as much
as representations with a high degree of similarity under the same time-structure.
While Lewandowsky and Oberauer (2009) hypothesize that the actual duration
of the processing episode does not affect memory strengths, they suggest that memory
traces undergo an accumulating process of reconstruction between processing episodes.
Essentially, faster processing would result in stronger memory traces because the
time available for reconstruction is greater, not because traces undergo less decay.
22

To evaluate these dueling hypotheses, Barrouillet, De Paepe, and Langerock (2012)
manipulated the processing time in a complex span task while keeping the time
between processing episodes constant. They found further support for the temporal
decay hypothesis when longer processing episodes elicited poorer recall performance.

1.5

Overview of ACT-R
To facilitate my goal of developing a computational model of TBRS that can be

applied to real-world scenarios, such as driving (Salvucci, 2006) or human-machine
teams (Demir et al., 2015), I have chosen to construct my model within the Adaptive
Control of Thought – Rational (ACT-R) cognitive architecture (Anderson, 2007;
Anderson et al., 2004). A cognitive architecture is both a theory of human cognition
as well as a framework for developing cognitive models. ACT-R is implemented in the
programming language LISP, which allows its models to be computationally evaluated.
This is especially useful when developing large, complex and dynamic models. Many
researchers worldwide support the architecture through empirical studies in multiple
areas of cognitive science including memory (Anderson, 2007; Anderson et al., 1998;
Lebiere & Lee, 2002), learning (Anderson, 2005; Anderson & Betz, 2001; Blessing
& Anderson, 1996; Janssen & Gray, 2012; Thomson & Lebiere, 2013), language
processing (Ball, 2004, 2013; Budiu & Anderson, 2004; Reitter, Keller, & Moore, 2011),
perception and action (Cao, Qin, Zhao, & Shen, 2015; Halverson & Gunzelmann,
2011; Harrison & Trafton, 2010; Taatgen, Van Rijn, & Anderson, 2007; Tamborello
& Byrne, 2006), problem solving (Altmann & Trafton, 2002; Guhe, Pease, & Smaill,
2009; Reitter, Juvina, Stocco, & Lebiere, 2010; Taatgen, Huss, Dickison, & Anderson,
2008), and decision-making (Dickison & Taatgen, 2007; Marewski & Mehlhorn, 2011;
Thomson, Lebiere, Anderson, & Staszewski, 2015). The use of a common framework
ensures that new models enjoy a theoretical foundation supported by existing research
while the architecture benefits from its expansion into and evaluation under new
23

paradigms. ACT-R provides a platform for integrating the task-specific elements
of my model with elements from other tasks, building toward a universal theory of
cognition (i.e. cognitive supermodels; Salvucci, 2010, 2013). The ability to generalize
to different tasks and situations is especially important when modeling WM because
WM influences processing in so many areas of cognition.
The structure of ACT-R is modularized so that certain cognitive processes are
localized within specialized units, called modules (e.g., the Goal module keeps track
of the current goal state, the Visual module controls visual attention, etc.). These
modules (Figure 1.1) are theorized to process information in parallel, performing
many calculations quickly and independently of any processing occurring in the other
modules. The modules communicate with each other through buffers. Buffers can
only hold one piece of information, called a chunk, and thus form bottlenecks in the
otherwise parallel architecture. Chunks are generic containers for sets of features,
called slots. A specialized module, the procedural module, performs a sort of central
processing role. The procedural module maintains a set of condition-action pairs called
production rules, the total of which represents procedural memory. If the contents of
the model’s buffers match the conditions of the production rule, then the actions (i.e.
buffer manipulations) of the production rule are executed by the procedural module.
The procedural module can only fire one production rule at a time, providing the
architecture with one final additional bottleneck. Because ACT-R contains perceptual
and motor modules based on well-established theories of perception and action (Byrne
& Anderson, 2001; Meyer & Kieras, 1997), it is able to model task performance from
the start of the trial to the end of the trial.
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Figure 1.1: Schematic representation of the ACT-R cognitive architecture
demonstrating the interaction of modules through buffers.
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1.6

Compatibility of ACT-R and TBRS
In addition to the previously discussed advantages of ACT-R, I chose to use

ACT-R because it conveniently shares or is highly compatible with all of the TBRS
model’s specifications. Recall the first assumption of TBRS: executive functions
(e.g., information processing and maintenance) require some limited resource called
attention. In an ACT-R model, information processing and maintenance take place
in modules at the request of the procedural module. The procedural module directs
attention by placing chunks in the buffers of modules. As such, the modules’ buffers
are considered to be the model’s foci of attention. The size of each attentional focus
is limited to the capacity of the buffer — one chunk. The rate at which attention
can be redirected is also limited in ACT-R. This rate, the production-firing rate, is
a parameter of ACT-R that controls how often the procedural model fires a new
production. Only one production may be fired at a time, and only one attention
redirection (buffer manipulation) can happen for each module when a production
fires. These limits on attention constitute a central bottleneck and consequentially
implement the second assumption of TBRS.
The analogy of buffers as attentional vessels is explicit in the visual module of
ACT-R. Visual attention is shifted when the procedural module submits a request to
the visual module with a particular visual location. The visual module then moves
its “eyes” to fixate on that location and places (encodes) a visual representation of
the object at that location into its buffer. In the same way, the declarative (memory)
module, at the request of the procedural module, takes cues in the form of feature-slot
values and shifts its attention to the most highly activated chunk that sufficiently
matches the cues. The module then puts that chunk into its buffer (i.e. into memory’s
focus of attention). The activation that governs both a chunk’s probability and speed
of recall is quantified with ACT-R’s activation equation. One specific portion of this
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equation, base-level learning (Equation 1.6), embodies the third assumption of TBRS,
that items in the focus of attention are refreshed while the others decay with time.
Activation increases as a function of the number of times n a chunk has been retrieved
(the frequency effect) and decays as a function of time since each retrieval (the recency
effect). When a chunk is retrieved (attention is shifted to it) and subsequently cleared
from a buffer, activation increases because the number of retrievals in Equation 1.6
has increased. When a chunk is not the focus of attention (not in the buffer), its
activation decays as a function of δ, a model parameter.

Bi = ln

n
X

!
t−δ
ij

(1.6)

j=1

The TBRS hypothesis that WM rapidly switches between maintenance and processing
activity is implemented by the modular structure of ACT-R. During the secondary
task, there are small time intervals where the declarative module is not required by
the task itself. One such interval is the time after a response has been decided and
motor processes are executing a button press. As long as the declarative module is
not currently busy, the procedural module is ready to fire, and a certain production
matches the current context (the contents of the buffers); that production can direct
the declarative module’s attention to targets of the recall task, independent of the
processing currently occurring in the other modules. In these ways, ACT-R is capable
of implementing a time-based, attentional resource-sharing model of working memory.
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2

Description of the Task

To validate the model, I chose to use an existing, published study rather than
design and conduct a new study myself. This provides a less controversial benchmark
for the model to pass than a new study because the human data will already have
been peer-reviewed. I chose the continuous span task from the third experiment of
Barrouillet et al. (2007) because it demonstrates temporal effects on WM spans across
two different tasks administered at varying presentation rates. Fitting these two
manipulations, comprising six experimental conditions, is more challenging and forces
my model to be more comprehensive than would a simpler experiment with only a
single manipulation. Participants were presented with a series of to-be-remembered
consonants interspersed with a fixed number of distractor elements (Figure 2.1). At the
end of each series, the word “Recall” was presented, prompting the participant to say
aloud the target consonants in the order they were presented. Each series was repeated
three times with new, randomly chosen consonants. As long as the subject was able
to correctly recall at least one of the three series at a particular level, the experiment
would continue with a new set of three series, each with one more target than the
prior set of three series. The experiment ended once the subject failed to correctly
recall all three series in a set or after they completed the seventh set. In Barrouillet
et al. (2007), 97 participants were divided into six between-subjects conditions (2
types of distractor task × 3 levels of number of inter-letter distractor elements). In
both types of distractor tasks, a number (in Arabic numeral form) would be presented
either above or below a horizontal centerline. In the parity condition, subjects were
required to respond by pressing the ‘f’ key if the number was odd and the ‘j’ key if the
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Figure 2.1: Timeline of the three distractor-pacing conditions: four, six, and eight;
from the top-down, respectively. Parity and location judgment conditions only differed
with respect to instructions. Each series started with the presentation of an asterisk,
followed by a target letter and then a set of distractors (numbers). After the last
number was presented, if every item in the list had been presented, the word “Recall”
would be presented. Otherwise, a new target letter would be presented and the portion
between the vertical dashed lines would be repeated.
number was even. In the spatial location condition, subjects were required to respond
by pressing the ‘f’ key if the number appeared below the centerline and the ‘j’ key if
the number appeared above the centerline. Although instructed to respond differently
depending on the condition to which they were assigned, subjects in both conditions
were presented with exactly the same stimuli. Target letters were always presented
for 1,500 ms followed by a 500 ms inter-stimulus interval (ISI) and then 6,400 ms of
distractor items. The rate at which distractors were presented, however, depended on
the experimental condition (Figure 2.1). Four, six or eight distractors were presented
for 1,067 ms, 711 ms or 533 ms, respectively, with corresponding ISIs: 533 ms, 356
ms or 267 ms. Span scores were calculated by taking the sum of correctly recalled
series divided by three (essentially all-or-nothing unit scoring; Conway et al., 2005).
Before beginning the experiment proper, participants completed 96 practice distractor
items in their assigned condition, followed by two practice series of the continuous
span task.
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2.1

Human Results
TBRS predicts that cognitive load, not task difficulty or task duration, affects

observed WM span. (Barrouillet et al., 2007) demonstrate this in Experiment 3 by
manipulating the type of distractor task and pacing while holding duration constant.
They report group means for WM spans, distractor response times (RT), and “total
processing times” (TPT), which are the sum of RTs per string of stimuli. I relay
these results in Table 2.1. Barrouillet et al. (2007) do not analyze the accuracy of the
parity/location judgments (reported as 91% and 97% respectively) beyond checking
that a criterion of 80% was surpassed. For the other dependent variables, I provide a
qualitative summary of their statistical analyses; for specific values, I invite the reader
to reference the original manuscript.
Mean WM spans were poorer in the parity condition than the location condition
(4.48 and 5.23, respectively). They were also found to decrease as the number of
inter-letter distractors increased: 5.36, 5.05 and 4.15; marginalized for four, six, and
eight stimuli, respectively. No significant interaction was observed. Mean RTs were
significantly greater for the parity condition than the location condition (554 ms and
411 ms, marginalized respectively), reflecting the relative difficulty of the tasks. Mean
RTs were also found to decrease, without interaction, as the number of inter-letter
distractor items increased (556 ms, 469 ms and 422 ms for four, six, and eight stimuli,
respectively), which the authors suggest may indicate the presence of a speed-accuracy
trade-off coping strategy. Similarly, mean TPTs were significantly greater for the
parity condition than the location condition (3,147 ms and 2,351 ms, respectively)
and increased with the number of inter-letter distractor items (2,198 ms, 2,774 ms
and 3,275 ms for four, six, and eight stimuli, respectively).
After including TPT as the covariate in an ANCOVA, Barrouillet et al. (2007)
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Note. Response time measures (RT and TPT) are reported in milliseconds. Standard deviations reported in
parentheses.

4
6
8
M

Number of
Distractors

Parity

Type of Distractor Task

Table 2.1: Results from experiment 3 of Barrouillet et al. (2007)

found that task type no longer significantly predicted mean span, suggesting the effect
of task is produced solely by the task’s temporal demands and not its difficulty. By
contrast the inclusion of TPT also reduced the main effect of the number of distractors,
but this effect remained significant, which they suggest may reflect the presence of
switching costs.
To illustrate these results, Barrouillet et al. (2007) regressed group mean spans
on TPT divided by the total time available per string of stimuli. Assuming response
times are representative of the interval during which the central bottleneck is blocked,
this ratio is a proxy for cognitive load (see Equation 1.4). The slopes (–7.82 and
–7.68 for the parity and the location tasks, respectively) and intercepts (8.04 and 7.84
for the parity and location tasks, respectively) of the two regression lines were very
similar, further supporting TBRS. These regressions relating span to cognitive load
will be important for my model to reproduce because they characterize TBRS’s main
prediction (Equation 1.3).
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3

Description of the Model

The model follows a general pattern of behavior to implement TBRS. It prioritizes
addressing experiment-generated stimuli, whether a target to encode, a distractor to
interpret and to respond, or a probe to recall. While not engaged in such processing,
the model defaults to making repeated memory retrievals to simulate attentional
refreshing. The specifics of these modes of cognitive behavior are best discussed in
terms of declarative memory and non-declarative considerations.

3.1

Declarative Memory
The declarative knowledge structure employs five types, or classes, of chunks: a

generic goal chunk to maintain the current goal state, stimulus chunks to encode the
semantic representation of a stimulus, target chunks to encode the to-be-remembered
episodes (consonants), number fact chunks to reflect parity knowledge of digits, and
response rules to represent the task instructions. Examples of specific members of these
chunk-types are provided in Table 3.1. I do not explicitly model the instructions phase
of the experiment and assume that response rules are already present and accessible
in declarative memory. Similarly the model is assumed to have prior knowledge of
letters, words, and numbers; and can readily recognize them. Only the target chunks
do not exist in memory at the start of the experiment; the model generates them after
interpreting a particular stimulus as an item to be remembered.
The retrieval of chunks from declarative memory is governed by the model’s
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Semantic representation
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Semantic representation
Used to indicate the head of a list; null for the list’s remaining members
Unique identifier of the list to which this target belongs
Representation of when the target was first encoded

Semantic representation
Category of stimulus

Semantic representation
Category of stimulus

Semantic representation
Category of stimulus
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The current task (parity or location judgment)
“1000”
Unique identifier of the current list of targets
get-resp-rule General state variable used to control behavior
above
Location of the current stimulus
“f”
Which/whether a response has been made
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Note. Slot values in quotes indicate character strings. All other values are numerical or chunks themselves.
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parity-goal

goal
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Table 3.1: Declarative Memory Chunk Examples
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where Ai is the activation of chunk i, ti j is the time elapsed since the j th presentation
of chunk i, n is the number of times chunk i has entered memory, and ε is logistically
distributed noise independently generated for each retrieval attempt. I override the
default partial-matching component Pi to implement my own formulation of temporal
association:

Pi =










0

if chunk i matches the request perfectly

−∞
else if chunk i is not a target chunk








ξ − η · ln 1 + i −requested
else if chunk i is a target chunk
ω

(3.2)

where i is the value in target chunk i’s episode slot (when it first entered memory)
and requested is the value in the episode slot of the retrieval cue. A full list of the
model parameters is provided in Table 3.2.
The first logarithmic component of the model’s specific activation equation
(Equation 3.1) is the previously discussed base-level learning component (Equation 1.6).
This element embodies the core mechanism of WM. When a chunk is retrieved or first
encoded, a new trace to that particular memory is established. After the chunk is
cleared from the focus of attention, the active connection of that specific trace to the
present is severed and it decays away. The accessibility of the chunk at some later
time is the sum of its surviving traces.
The partial-matching component Pi effectively only acts on the retrieval of
target chunks; non-target chunks are quantitatively penalized in a way that simulates
symbolic matching (i.e. zero mismatch penalty for identical chunks and infinitely
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Table 3.2: Model Parameters
Name

Symbol

Value(s)

Fixed

Utility learning rate
Utility noise
Base-level learning decay
Activation noise
Base-level inhibition scaling
Temporal association scaling
Temporal association constant
Retrieval threshold

α
sU
δ
sA
γs
ω
ξ
τ

0.2
1
0.5
0.3
1
1
0
0

Free

Reward
Base-level inhibition decay
Base-level constant
Episodic selectivity
Latency exponent
Latency factor

R
γd
β
η
f
F

[1, 5, 9, 13, 17]
[2, 3, 4, 5, 6]
[1, 3, 5, 7, 9]
[2, 3, 4, 5, 6]
[0.1, 0.4, 0.7, 1.0, 1.3]
[0.1, 0.3, 0.5, 0.7, 0.9]

large mismatch penalty for unlike chunks). Partial-matching as implemented in this
model (Equation 3.2) provides the structure of the memorized list through a penalty
proportional to the log-time between target encodings. A chunk is maximally similar
to itself (hence 0 penalty) while it is increasingly less similar to chunks encoded at
increasingly different times, producing greater negative associations. The temporal
association constant ξ is used to counterbalance framing partial-matching as a penalty
(i.e. choosing to subtract activation from dissimilar items rather than adding activation
to similar items). Note that when the temporal association scaling parameter ω is set
to 1, chunks are compared by the difference in their absolute times of encoding, but as
ω approaches the target presentation rate, the comparison approaches the difference in
their ordinal positions (i.e. positional coding). In this way, the model takes advantage
of the ecology of the task: the serial order of the targets is already established by their
presentation order; the model must only preserve it.
The second logarithmic component of Equation 3.2 corresponds to base-level
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inhibition (Lebiere & Best, 2009). The current form of this mechanism in ACT-R
evolved from repeated attempts to resolve the longstanding need for a method of
repetition suppression in the architecture. ACT-R originally enacted a form of
suppression using FINSTs, which in Pylyshyn (1989) indexed object positions for
tracking but in ACT-R are used to keep track of previously attended items, where
recently attended visual stimuli or recently retrieved memories are tagged so that they
can be ignored during later requests. However, such an all-or-nothing mechanism,
similar to the nonspecific suppression mechanism in primacy models, is too strong, and
it is unclear why or how a cognitive system would know when to release the FINST.
Juvina and Taatgen (2009) adapted the classic ACT-R FINST mechanism to decay
continuously with time in a manner functionally equivalent to the current base-level
inhibition mechanism. They use decaying FINSTs to explain between-trial effects
in the Stroop paradigm while providing a thorough refutation of suppression-free
accounts. Base-level inhibition has also been used to explain sequential effects in
task-switching experiments (Grange & Juvina, 2015; Grange, Juvina, & Houghton,
2013).
Temporal inhibition provides the model with a means for traversing the list
during maintenance. Consider the case when an item from the target list has just
been retrieved for refreshing and now the next item must be retrieved. Rather than
estimating the context of the next target item and then using that as its retrieval cue,
as in Burgess and Hitch (2006), the model simply uses the immediately accessible
context of the just retrieved item, relying on the fact that the next item in the
list is temporally proximate to this context. Base-level inhibition heavily penalizes
very recently retrieved items, preventing the just retrieved chunk, which matches the
retrieval request perfectly, from being retrieved again. Without it, this strategy would
never be able to rehearse more than one item.
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It is worth noting that the model is able to account for forward, ordered traversal
of the target list without using an explicit primacy gradient (cf. Page & Norris,
1998; Solway et al., 2012). The associations constituting the structure of the list
(Equation 3.2) are bidirectional, meaning that the target item at position x in the list
equally cues the items at positions x − 1 and x + 1 (assuming constant presentation
rate). In fact, because earlier items in the list were presented earlier in the task, the
item at position x − 1 will necessarily have had more opportunities to be refreshed
than the item at position x + 1. Thus it is likely to have respectively greater activation,
and therefore more likely to be retrieved, due to base-level learning (Equation 1.6).
However, for this same reason, the item at position x − 1 is likely to have been
retrieved recently before the item (at position x) now being used as the retrieval cue,
causing it to be penalized by inhibition. The item at position x + 1, on the other
hand, likely has not been retrieved since the last refreshing cycle through the list,
causing it to experience minimal inhibition. Provided the parameters of the model
are sufficiently calibrated for base-level inhibition to overcome base-level learning,
items will be retrieved one after the other in consecutive order. Although inhibition
encourages forward traversal of the target list, it does not strictly enforce it. If for any
reason an item were to be skipped over, causing a transposition error, the skipped
item (at position x − 1) would not undergo inhibition and be free to compete with the
item at position x + 1. The aforementioned greater relative activation of the preceding
item would likely cause it to be retrieved over the successive item, which may provide
an explanation for the “fill-in” effect (Surprenant, Kelley, Farley, & Neath, 2005).
The two remaining terms in Equation 3.1 are the base-level constant β and
transient activation noise ε. The base-level constant is a simple constant parameter
used to counter the penalties of base-level inhibition and partial-matching. The
transient noise component ε is independently sampled from a logistic distribution
(intended to simulate a Gaussian distribution with µ = 0 and σ 2 =
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π2 2
s ,
3 A

where sA is

a model parameter; see Table 3.2) each time the activation is computed for a chunk.
The noise term not only allows for errors and failures to be made during retrieval,
it contributes to the variability in retrieval latencies. The time it takes to retrieve a
chunk RTi is dependent on its activation Ai and computed using the following:

RTi =




F · e−(f ·Ai )

Ai ≥ τ



F · e−(f ·τ )

Ai < τ

(3.3)

Equation 3.3 simulates the memory search process. It assumes that the cognitive
system attempts retrieval for a particular length of time before giving up if a matching
chunk has not been found yet. The time it takes for the search to retrieve a chunk is
an exponential function of its activation, scaled by the latency factor parameter F
and the latency exponent parameter f (Table 3.2). If no chunk matches the retrieval
request with activation greater than some threshold τ , then τ is used in place of
activation to compute the latency of the failed retrieval. In my model, if the model
fails to retrieve a chunk in the service of responding to a distractor, then it is forced
to guess. If it fails to retrieve a chunk while engaged in maintenance (refreshing), then
it simply tries again to refresh any target chunk.
Lastly, because chunks like the response rules, letters, and numbers representations
are long-term memories and not transient like the target chunks, I needed to stabilize
their activations at some value above threshold to ensure that they are nearly always
retrievable (or else the model may forget how to read!). One way to do this in ACT-R
is to artificially create a number of past references to the chunks used in base-level
learning (Equation 1.6). ACT-R’s set-base-levels command is designed to achieve this
by creating some modeler-specified number of evenly spaced references back to some
modeler-specified time. I first estimated the maximum duration of an experimental
session by adding up the fixed durations of every trial and estimates of recall latencies
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from preliminary model runs. Then I calculated the 95th percentile of the retrieval
noise distribution to determine how much activation corresponds to reliably above the
retrieval threshold. Simulating the set-base-levels command in R (R Development Core
Team, 2008), I found values (number of references: 1250; first creation-time: -1,000,000
seconds) that produced a relatively flat level of activation at my threshold for twice
the approximate experiment duration. Fine-grained adjustment of this activation
during fitting is controlled by the base-level constant (β) parameter.
I disabled ACT-R’s spreading activation mechanism, which allows associations
between a chunk and the model’s buffer contents to influence retrieval, for two reasons.
The first reason is simplicity. The only type of association employed by my model is
between the temporal features of target items, and it is easy enough to implement
this using partial-matching, which is already required to account for retrieval errors.
The second reason is because spreading activation invokes ACT-R’s fan mechanism. I
wanted to avoid using the fan mechanism, which divides source activation amongst
associations, at all costs because, as discussed earlier with respect to Anderson et al.
(1996), this could be interpreted as a capacity-sharing constraint on WMC, and the
body of work supporting TBRS has refuted this class of capacity-sharing models.

3.2

Non-Declarative Learning
The above discussion of declarative memory chunks and the mathematical

formulas determining their accessibility formalizes the knowledge of the model. The
non-declarative aspects, which conduct the remaining facets of cognitive behavior,
are realized through the production matching, compilation and utility learning
mechanisms.
I briefly described the process of production rule matching when introducing
ACT-R. At regular intervals, typically 50 ms, the procedural module engages in
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what is termed conflict resolution. During conflict resolution, the production rules
whose conditions are compatible with the current state of every module’s buffer are
identified. If only one production matches the current buffer context it is fired, and
if no productions match, then the procedural module remains idle until a change
in some buffer triggers another round of conflict resolution. However, if multiple
productions match then the production with the greatest utility (after adding some
random noise, independently generated each conflict resolution from an approximated
normal distribution with µ = 0 and σ 2 =

π2 2
s ,
3 U

where sU is the utility noise parameter

(Table 3.2); see previous note regarding sA ) is selected. Utility values are assigned to
each production when the model is first defined, and they are updated whenever the
model is rewarded according to the following:

Ui (k) = Ui (k − 1) + α[Ri − Ui (k − 1)]

(3.4)

Equation 3.4 is a simple difference-learning rule that adjusts Ui , the utility of
production i, at each reward event k to approach the expected reward for firing that
production at a rate controlled by the learning rate parameter (α; Table 3.2). The
amount of reward (R; Table 3.2) is a free parameter and is awarded after the model
responds to a trial. When a reward is triggered, every production i that fired since
the last reward was received is awarded Ri , the initial amount R minus the time (in
seconds) since it was fired. This aspect, combined with Equation 3.4, ensures that
productions that lead to greater payoffs more quickly are selected more frequently.
Utility learning allows the model to learn which productions to fire when.
Production compilation, the other form of procedural learning in ACT-R, allows the
model to learn new productions through the fusion of existing productions. Essentially,
this mechanism manifests the transitive relation of two productions that repeatedly
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fire in close succession: if one production causes the model to transition from state A
to state B (A → B), and another causes the model to transition from state B to state
C (B → C), the model may learn a third production which transitions directly from
state A to state C (A → C). Specifically, any time two eligible productions fire in
succession, a compilation of the two is created. The first time a compiled production is
created it is initialized with zero utility. Every additional time it is created its utility
is updated according to Equation 3.4 with reward equal to the current utility of its
first parent. Thus it takes repetition for a compiled production to achieve enough
utility to compete with its parents, but once utility noise leads to its selection, it
should accomplish its goal faster than its parents and begin to receive more reward
than them. A series of checks within the ACT-R source code ensure that only “safe”
productions are compiled (productions that will not create new bugs or discontinuities
in the model). Along these lines, only buffer manipulations that produce predictable
transitions may be compiled out. In the previous example, if the first production
made a request to the vision module that was then checked in state B and used in
the second production to transition to state C, these two productions cannot compile
because the state of the environment obtained by the vision module is external and not
predictable. Retrieval requests, however, are internal and dependent on the state of
the model; therefore, when the model makes such a request it can be reasonably sure
of what it will get back. This manifestation of production compilation is most relevant
to my model, specifically in regard to response selection. For example, one production
may request the correct response to an odd parity stimulus, and another production
may initiate pressing the “f” key after retrieving the “respond-odd” response rule.
Through production compilation, the model may learn to skip this retrieval and press
the “f” key directly after determining that the stimulus is odd. Such learning may
improve performance by reducing response latencies and by decreasing cognitive load
by eliminating declarative retrievals.
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Utility learning and production compilation are hypothesized to each contribute
to the correlation between distractor pace and RT. Because there is less time available
to respond in the faster conditions, fewer productions can lead to correct responses
within the time allotted. These are the only productions that will be rewarded;
therefore, the reduced time available to respond in these conditions strongly influences
RT. Furthermore, because the total time per target-distractor series is constant in all
conditions, the faster conditions contain more distractors. These additional processing
episodes are additional opportunities for production compilation, which should decrease
RTs in these conditions.

3.3

Production Rules and Model Behavior
The model’s production rules, comprising its procedural knowledge, are broadly

organized into six subroutines. Figure 3.1 demonstrates that the perception subroutine
(Figure 3.2) receives the highest priority (by setting the initial utility of these
productions to an arbitrary large value). I made this assumption because many
demands of the task are stimulus driven and because, with regard to evolution,
attending to changes in one’s environment has great utility for survival. Whenever a
stimulus appears on the display, the model fires productions which move its visual
attention to that object. The object is then visually encoded, that is it is interpreted by
retrieving its semantic representation from declarative memory. Depending on which
kind of stimulus was presented (i.e. the value in the type slot of the stimulus chunk
retrieved; see Table 3.1), the model advances to one of the four intermediate-priority
subroutines.
After stimulus encoding, the first subroutine to which the model may proceed
is the new-list subroutine (Figure 3.3). In Experiment 3 of Barrouillet et al. (2007),
the presentation of an asterisk in the center of the screen indicates the beginning of a
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Figure 3.1: Schematic depicting the high-level organization of the model’s subroutines.

Figure 3.2: Schematic representation of the perception subroutine.
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Figure 3.3: Schematic representation of the new-list subroutine.
new series of targets (i.e. a new list to remember). When this happens, the model
generates a new context (implemented as a unique character string; see the which-list
slot in the goal chunk-type in Table 3.1) to associate with the new list, and it sets a
variable in the goal buffer-chunk to encode the next target presented as the first item
in the list.
When the stimulus retrieved is of type letter, it is a new target for the model to
commit to the current list. The target-related subroutine (Figure 3.4) recruits the
imaginal module, which is used in ACT-R to add new chunks to declarative memory,
to create a new target chunk (see Table 3.1), representing the episodic memory of the
item’s presentation. The new target chunk includes its semantic representation, the
list to which it belongs (the context in the goal buffer at the time of encoding), and
the time at which it was encoded. This last feature, which is used to compute the
similarity between two items in Equation 3.2, is artificially obtained to reduce the
parameter space and simplify the coding process. A more rigorous approach would
be to acquire the temporal representation of the item using the temporal module
(Taatgen et al., 2007), a relatively newer addition to the ACT-R architecture. This
would not change behavior of the current model, but may be useful for future versions
(see Serial Memory in Discussion). Depending on whether the new-list subroutine
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recently marked this letter as the first in the list, the new chunk may also include a
slot indicating it as such. After the new target chunk has been fully encoded, which
takes time (default 200 ms), it is cleared from the imaginal buffer and properly enters
declarative memory so that it can be refreshed with the rest of the list items.
The most complex subroutine handles responses to distractors. Unlike the other
intermediate-priority subroutines, the distractor-related subroutine may initiate before
identifying the type of the stimulus. Distractors are the only stimuli that appear
outside the center of the screen. Furthermore, they never appear in the center of the
screen, making visual location a sufficient feature for identifying the stimulus as a
distractor. This is a safe assumption in the task modeled (Barrouillet et al., 2007,
: Experiment 3) because distractors were presented in the context of a horizontal
midline so that subjects only had to make a relative comparison rather than an
absolute spatial judgment. This assumption would most likely not hold in Barrouillet
et al.’s Experiment 2 (not modeled) where distractors were presented without a
reference line and overlapping so that the separation between potential locations
was less than the size of the stimuli. Importantly, the relative stimulus location is
available to the cognitive system (via the movement of visual attention) before the
stimulus is encoded and its semantic representation retrieved. Hence, the model
knows a distractor stimulus has been presented and is able to respond before even
identifying which number was presented. The model may guess (i.e., respond before
considering the appropriate response-rule set forth in the task instructions), but this
is likely a poor strategy in the parity condition (Figure 3.5) because the number
must be identified to first determine its parity and then its corresponding response
(three retrievals). However, in the spatial location condition (Figure 3.6]) neither the
number’s identity nor any additional property needs to be retrieved to be accurate;
the critical information needed to retrieve the response rule is available as soon as the
model’s “eyes” move (one retrieval). This does not mean that humans never identify
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Figure 3.4: Schematic representation of the target-related subroutine.
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the number before retrieving the appropriate response to its location, and the model
can choose to do so. The disparity in the number of task-required retrievals causes
spatial location judgments to be faster than parity judgments (Barrouillet et al., 2007).
Barrouillet et al. (2007) observed a speed-accuracy tradeoff in their data so I
designed the distractor-related subroutine to be similar to Peebles and Bothell (2004)
approach to modeling the speed-accuracy tradeoff. It combines a fast but less accurate
strategy with a slow but more accurate strategy. The general idea is that at each
point in the processing chain from stimulus to response (Figures 3.5 & 3.6) the model
may either collect more information, thus reducing the uncertainty in its response, or
it may guess, reducing its response latency. The mechanism of utility learning affords
the model to learn the best rate at which to select one strategy over the other, but
anytime the model guesses incorrectly it is forced to follow the slow but accurate
strategy (i.e. it is prevented from guessing) on the next trial (Peebles & Bothell, 2004).
This reflects Manly, Davison, Heutink, Galloway, and Robertson’s (2000) finding that
people slow down after making a mistake and helps the model to learn the correct
path. For simplicity, I have not built into the model any means for retrieving the
wrong information or otherwise making an unintentional mistake, although it would
be possible to do so. Any incorrect response made by the model is caused by guessing
incorrectly or failing to respond within the time limit of the trial.
Barrouillet et al. (2007) provided their subjects with feedback to their parity/location
judgments during training but not during testing. In order for the strategy-learning
approach described above to work, the model needs to know if its response was
correct or incorrect. To achieve this in the testing phase where explicit feedback was
not provided, the model engages in “metacognition”. Anytime the model guesses
it initiates its response and then continues down the processing tree (red paths in
Figures 3.5 & 3.6 until it retrieves the correct response rule. It then evaluates the
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Figure 3.5: Schematic representation of the distractor-related subroutine for the parity
condition.
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Figure 3.6: Schematic representation of the distractor-related subroutine for the
location condition.
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Figure 3.7: Schematic representation of the recall subroutine.
response it made against the retrieved rule to determine if it guessed correctly or not.
Correct guesses receive the same amount of reward as responding without guessing (i.e.
only after retrieving the response rule), while incorrect guesses receive zero reward.
The fourth stimulus-dependent subroutine (Figure 3.7) controls behavior in the
recall portion of the experiment. After perceiving the word “Recall”, the model
attempts to retrieve the first item in the list by requesting a target from the current
list-context that is marked as the first item (parent slot = start). After retrieving an
item, the model enters a loop where it vocalizes what it just retrieved and then uses
the retrieved item as the cue for the next retrieval. The model halts after vocalizing
as many items as in the true list or after failing to retrieve an item.
With the exception of when the recall subroutine is active, if at any point in the
experiment the model’s retrieval and visual buffers are empty and the declarative
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and vision modules are not busy (i.e. the central bottleneck is open), the model
begins refreshing its target memory traces. The maintenance subroutine (Figure 3.8)
is quite simple and consists of only two productions. The first, firing when the
above conditions are met, makes a generic retrieval request for any target chunk
with the current list-context. This avoids the modeling problem of deciding whether
maintenance should always start with a certain item, such as the first item in the
list or the last item refreshed. It is also another opportunity for inhibition to adapt
the retrieval process by guiding attention toward items that have not been refreshed
lately and thus avoiding wasting limited refreshing time on items that most likely do
not need to be refreshed immediately. The second maintenance production, firing
after a target chunk has been retrieved, uses the just retrieved chunk as an additional
cue for requesting another target chunk with the current list-context. The second
production repeats itself for as long as the central bottleneck remains open, continuing
the refreshing loop until the declarative module is recruited by a higher priority routine.
Typically, this happens when a new stimulus is presented, prompting the perception
subroutine to determine the identity of the percept. The maintenance subroutine can
be thought of as the “default” mode of the system, while the perception subroutine
represents episodes of exogenous attentional capture, and the remaining subroutines
reflect endogenous, task-driven redirection of attention.
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Figure 3.8: Schematic representation of the maintenance subroutine.
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4

Parameters and Simulation

The model contains 14 different parameters (Table 3.2), 8 of which can be
reasonably fixed at a priori values. The primary reason for fixing these parameters is
tractability — each free parameter exponentially increases the size and complexity
of my simulation. Superfluous free parameters also subvert the model by making it
excessively flexible. Accordingly, the six remaining parameters will be fitted because
it is essentially unavoidable.

4.1

Fixed Parameters
The following fixed parameters are discussed in the order of degree by which they

have existing, accepted default values within ACT-R. Parameters with arbitrarily
fixed values are justified last. The utility learning rate α is kept at its default value
of 0.2. Ahn, Busemeyer, Wagenmakers, and Stout (2008) conducted a quantitative
comparison of various reinforcement learning models of decisions within the Iowa
Gambling Task and the Soochow Gambling Task. The learning rates they estimated
to best fit the human data for each respective task, 0.17 and 0.22, suggest this default
value is reasonable.
The utility noise parameter sU and base-level decay parameter δ do not have true
default values because their default value is to turn off their respective mechanisms
(noisy conflict resolution and base-level learning); however, they do have conventional
values within the ACT-R community. Utility noise is commonly set to 1 (Anderson,
2007) so that conflict resolution approximates Luce’s choice rule (Luce, 1959). Anderson
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(2007) notes that “In the ACT-R community, 0.5 has emerged as the default value for
the [base-level] decay parameter δ over a range of applications.” I use these values for
correspondence with the existing literature.
Similarly, the default value of the activation noise parameter sA is to turn
off activation noise within ACT-R. Activation noise plays a significant role in the
production of errors by the model, yet there is less agreement on its value within
the community. Therefore, I consulted a database of the parameter values used
in submitted ACT-R models maintained by the Center for Adaptive Behavior and
Cognition located at the Max Planck Institute for Human Development Berlin. I
chose to fix activation noise at the database’s median value of 0.3 (An online database
for ACT-R estimated parameters, n.d.).
Three parameters do not have common values because they are not attributes of
the standard ACT-R release, either by others’ extension or by my own. For example,
base-level inhibition is a relatively new addition to the architecture (it is included
with the software distribution but not loaded by default when ACT-R is initialized),
and convergent values for its two parameters are not available. By systematically
plotting the base-level inhibition function for various values of each parameter, it is
apparent that if inhibition is typically only employed over a relatively narrow temporal
window, then it is possible to achieve similar inhibition penalties through a tradeoff
in parameters. Therefore, I sought to fix one of these parameters. In preliminary
development, I found that the decay parameter γd seemed to have the larger impact
on the model’s behavior, while the scaling parameter γs did not notably affect model
performance. For simplicity, I fixed the base-level inhibition scaling parameter at 1 so
that absolute time since the last retrieval is the critical variable used in computing
inhibition.
Similar to base-level inhibition, the temporal association parameters in Equation 3.2
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have no standard values because I created the equation specifically for this model. It is
not obvious to what the temporal association scaling parameter ω in particular should
be set. This parameter may trade-off with other temporal association parameters in a
manner that is impossible to identify without the constraint of serial position data (to
which I do not have access). The inclusion of ω in the model is more for completeness
than anything else, so I fix it at 1 and use absolute time as the critical variable in order
to be consistent with base-level learning and base-level inhibition. An alternative to
using ω = 1, corresponding to similarity between temporal contexts, would be to set
this scaling parameter to the target presentation rate, thereby defining association
as similarity between list positions. I avoid this approach because of my previously
discussed reservations regarding positional encoding and leave further investigations
into the proper value of this parameter to future studies.
The temporal association constant ξ was originally included in the model to
counter the partial-matching penalty by providing a means for raising heavily penalized
items back above the retrieval threshold without impacting the activation of so-called
LTM chunks. However, nonzero values of ξ lead to a discontinuity in Equation 3.2 in
its current form. Assuming ω = 1, when the difference between the retrieval cue and a
target chunk’s temporal context is less than eξ/η − 1, Equation 3.2 yields nonnegative
“penalties” when ξ > 0, actually providing a boost in activation over identical chunks.
When ξ < 0, the opposite is true, and the association penalty never approaches zero.
One solution to this would be to no longer treat partial-matching as a penalty and
allow identical chunks to receive additional (specifically ξ) activation, but this would
be a drastic departure from the way partial-matching is traditionally used within
ACT-R. Another potential solution would be to further modify partial-matching to
equal mini (0, Pi ), where Pi is still Equation 3.2. The addition of such a minimum
function would solve the nonnegative penalty problem but introduce new issues.
Mathematically, this modification introduces an elbow such that penalty no longer
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smoothly approaches its maximum. Psychologically, this function would cause all
targets encoded within eξ/η − 1 seconds of each other to be interpreted as temporally
identical. While this is an approach I do not wish to take currently, it may be an
interesting route for future work regarding people’s ability to temporally discriminate
items. Because these concerns may be of interest to the reader, I leave Equation 3.2
as it is but fix the temporal association constant ξ at 0.
The final fixed parameter of the model is the retrieval threshold τ , which I set to
0. In addition to reducing the size of the parameter space and helping to constrain
possible parametric trade-offs, fixing the retrieval threshold at zero in particular also
provides a couple convenient interpretations to certain aspects of the model. First,
there is simplicity in designating chunks with positive activation as retrievable and
those without as inaccessible. Second, examination of Equation 3.3 reveals that when
τ = 0, the latency factor parameter F becomes immediately interpretable as the
latency of a failed retrieval, or how long the model is willing to attempt to retrieve
something.

4.2

Free Parameters
Six model parameters were explored through simulation. In order to better

understand the relationships between these parameters and performance, a coarse
grid search was used, evaluating the model at each parameter combination. This is
in contrast to an adaptive search, which only tries to determine the best parameter
combination at arbitrary scale. Such a method may identify the “best” combination
of parameters without furthering any understanding of how and why the model works.
The reward parameter R governs the payoff productions receive during utility
learning. Because incorrect guesses are always awarded zero reward, this parameter
effectively represents the difference (in expected utility) between choices that lead
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to correct responses and those that lead to incorrect responses. Greater values of R
should cause the model to learn to give correct responses more often. Because the
correct response pattern will be learned sooner with greater R, these productions
should be repeated more, leading to more compilation. The best value for the reward
parameter will generate the improved RTs observed in the conditions with more
distractors, where there is more opportunity for learning, while still allowing for the
slower responses observed in the conditions with only four distractors.
The base-level inhibition decay parameter γd controls how heavily recently
retrieved chunks are penalized. Larger values of this parameter will cause larger
penalties than smaller values, counteracting the activation built up by earlier targets
through repeated refreshing. It is hypothesized that some minimal amount of inhibition
is required for the model to function properly, but past a particular level increased
γd will begin to cause other parameters, such as the base-level constant to increase
in order to trade-off with its immense penalty. The base-level constant β primarily
serves to counteract the base-level inhibition and partial-matching penalties. It is
also used to tune the activation of LTM chunks such as number facts and response
rules. Greater values of β globally increase the activation of all chunks, increasing
the chances that it is above threshold and reducing retrieval latency. Because the
base-level constant is framed as a counter to penalties, it is hypothesized to potentially
trade-off most highly with other parameters. In particular, larger values of β allow
increased base-level inhibition and temporal association gradients, which in turn allow
for increased discrimination amongst items.
The episodic selectivity parameter η defines the linear strength of the logarithmic
similarity gradient across the temporal contexts of target chunks. Together with the
base-level inhibition decay parameter, this parameter controls the accuracy of the
iteration of the target list during refreshing. Specifically, this parameter is hypothesized
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to play a significant role in determining the rate of anticipation errors, or the rate at
which the item in position x + 2 is mistakenly retrieved in place of the item at position
x + 1. Larger values of η lead to more reliable retrieval of the immediate items in
a list, while smaller values effectively increase the similarity between all items and
increase the influence of base-level activation.
The latency exponent parameter f controls the sensitivity of retrieval latency to
activation. Larger values are more sensitive, while smaller values are less sensitive.
In the extreme, f = 0 causes retrieval latency to always equal the latency factor
parameter F , regardless of activation (Equation 3.3). The latency factor parameter
F controls the linear magnitude of the retrieval latency. Larger values unilaterally
increase the latency of all retrievals. As mentioned previously, when τ = 0, the
latency factor is also interpretable as the maximum amount of time the cognitive
system is willing to spend attempting retrieval. Together, these two parameters (f
and F ) scale retrieval latency and may trade-off to determine the response time after
other parameters like the base-level constant have settled. They also play a role in
determining how many refreshing retrievals may take place during maintenance.
Overall, parameters are assumed to not vary across task conditions. Unique
parameter combinations are interpreted as representing potential populations, while
repeated simulations of a specific parameter combination are interpreted as sampling
individuals from that population. A summary of the values used for fixed parameters
and the ranges of values searched over for the free parameters may be found in
Table 3.2.

4.3

Model Simulation
The entirety of Experiment 3, including training phase, was reconstructed in

LISP using the details found in the methods section of Barrouillet et al. (2007). Lists
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of target and distractor stimuli were created in parallel such that the conditions with
more stimuli (the 6- and 8-distractor conditions) contained the exact same stimuli
as the corresponding trials in conditions with fewer between-target distractors while
still maintaining the frequencies outlined in Barrouillet et al. (2007). Stimuli lists are
randomly generated when the model code is first loaded, but the same lists were used
throughout parameter fitting sessions.
Five values for each of the six free parameters composed the grid search, yielding
15625 possible combinations. I ran 50 iterations of each parameter combination,
systematically changing the seed of the pseudorandom number generator each time to
simulate 50 unique individuals for each condition. In order to evaluate such a large
space in a relatively timely manner, I took advantage of the massively distributed,
volunteer computing service MindModeling@Home (Harris, Gluck, Mielke, & Moore,
2009). MindModeling@Home distributes individual model runs around the world
and uses the idle processor time on volunteers’ computers to simulate hundreds of
parameter configurations in parallel, completing in days what would take a single
machine decades to compute. Due to the complexity of the parameter space, it was
used throughout the model building process to explore the behavior of the model and
ensure that various components behaved as intended.
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5
5.1

Results

Model Evaluation Metrics
Five group measures were of interest: mean accuracy, mean span, mean RT,

mean total processing time per inter-letter interval (TPT), and linear regression
coefficient of span upon CL (slope). Five metrics were developed to quantify the
agreements between the model and human data for each respective measure. Error
for mean span, mean RT, and mean TPT were calculated by summing across the six
experimental conditions the standardized (using the standard deviations reported in
Barrouillet et al., 2007) absolute differences between model and human group averages
(Equations 5.1-5.3). Error due to distractor response accuracy was modeled as a linear
function, scaled to yield 4 at the chance rate (50%) and 0 at or above Barrioullet et
al.’s criterion of 80% for each condition (Equation 5.4). Because the span error, RT
error, and TPT error scores appeared to vary between 3 and 8 during preliminary
analysis, the choice of scaling for error due to accuracy reflects the decision that a
parameter combination that produces perfect span, RT, and TPT scores but only
chance level accuracy is equally as bad as a combination that produces acceptable
accuracy levels but poor span, RT, and TPT results. I chose this equivalence because
although accuracy is not a DV of remarkable interest to the study, any model that
cannot meet such a bare-minimum is categorically wrong.
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Span Error =

RT Error =

TPT Error =

6
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6
X
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X
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σTˆP Ti
i=1

(5.1)

(5.2)

(5.3)

6

Accuracy Error =

40 X
max(0, .8 − accuracyi )
3 i=1 i

(5.4)

parity, location

Slope Error =

X

| sin(arctan(bˆi ) − arctan(b¯i ))|

(5.5)

i

When it comes to calculating the regression slope of span upon CL, one could
imagine the case where, due to variability in TPTs, the regression line turns out to be
nearly vertical. In this situation, the regression coefficient could be largely negative or
largely positive depending on exactly where the points lie. In the limit, each situation
should be identical (and equally bad), but a simple difference metric would treat
them as very different. In order to maintain continuity in the slope error function as
the regression coefficient approaches ±∞ (i.e. a completely vertical regression line),
the coefficient is transformed into angular space (Equation 5.5). The slope angles
for each (parity/location) condition are then passed through a sine function to yield
minimum (zero) error when the angles are identical but maximum error when they are
complementary (approximately 0.128 and 0.130 for b̄parity and b̄location , respectively).
Figure 5.1 illustrates this error function.
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Figure 5.1: Contribution to the slope error from a single condition as a function of
the regression coefficient observed in the model data. Note that both parity and
location conditions are present yet indistinguishable because the difference between
these coefficients in the human data is so small.
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5.2

Determining Parameterizations of Interest
A cumulative measure is useful for determining the parametric fitness of the

model over all areas of the task. The most straightforward method is a simple linear
combination of all the error measures previously described. For most of the error
measures, there is no a priori reason for favoring one component over another so equal
weightings will be used. However, there are justifications for either underweighting or
overweighting the slope error. The regression of span on CL reported in Barrouillet et
al. (2007) is conducted using group means of span and group means of CL instead of
the full set of individual datum pairs. Regressing means onto means may result in
overconfidence in the quantification (i.e. regression coefficient or slope) of the effect
of CL on span because variability in WMC (i.e. individual differences) introduces
uncertainty in the regression coefficient. Furthermore, regression dilution caused by
variance in TPTs (and therefore CL) contributes additional uncertainty by biasing the
regression coefficients toward zero (Riggs, Guarnieri, & Addelman, 1978). Ultimately,
linear regression over three data is never terribly convincing. For these reasons, it may
be prudent to place less weight on slope error relative to that accumulated by the other
measures. However, this regression is the central result of the original experiment,
demonstrating that task type does not affect WM span once CL is controlled. If
the uncertainty regarding its presence in the human data is ignored, then it is the
most important result to reproduce with the model and should receive more, not less,
weight. One approach to resolve this incongruity is to assume the trend between span
and CL is actually present in the data, which is not unreasonable given that other
studies that have found a similar effect, and use the equivalent weighting chosen for
accuracy to weight slope. A more rigorous method would be to treat the weight placed
upon slope error as an ad hoc variable and investigate the resulting error functions.
Framed in this fashion, the total error T is formulated as a linear function of the
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weight ϕ placed on the contribution from slope error (Equation 5.6). The intercept T0
of this function is the sum of the other error metrics (Equation 5.7).

T (ϕ) = T0 + ϕ · Slope Error

(5.6)

T0 = Span Error + RT Error + TPT Error + Accuracy Error

(5.7)

I evaluated total error functions for 0 ≤ ϕ ≤ 25 and determined which parameter
sets ever made it to the top 50 for any value of ϕ within this range. These functions
are plotted in Figure 5.2 with the line color indicating the set’s rank at ϕ = 0
(hotter colors reflect lower T0 ). It appears that as phi increases, two clusters emerge.
When slope error is plotted against T0 (Figure 5.3), the shape of the Pareto frontier
(Figure 5.4) suggests that the divide between these clusters seems to take place
around slope error = 0.65, which I designate with a dashed line. For emphasis, I
recolor Figure 5.2 using blue for lines with slope error > 0.65 and red for lines with
slope error ≤ 0.65 (Figure 5.5). In order to determine what parametric differences
may exist between these two clusters, I overlaid the parameter density distributions
for each group using the same color scheme (Figure 5.6). Upon inspection, the cluster
with smaller slope errors tends to allow larger values of the inhibition decay parameter
than the cluster with larger slope errors. It also appears to favor lower values for the
latency exponent parameter and to converge more strongly on 0.3 for the latency factor
parameter. The distributions of reward, base-level constant, and episodic selectivity
parameters do not differ between clusters.
To further explore the distributions of parameter values as a function of ϕ, I
plotted the parameter values of the top 50 sets at each point in ϕ, decreasing the
opacity of the plotting symbols as rank increases within a given value of ϕ (Figure 5.7).
Although Figure 5.6 and Figure 5.7 convey similar information, in discrete category
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Figure 5.2: Total error (Equation 5.6) as a function of the scalar weighting of slope
error (ϕ). Any parameter set in the lowest 50 total errors over the range shown
are included. Color indicates the relative ordering of these sets when slope error is
excluded.
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Figure 5.3: Slope error (Equation 5.5) plotted against the total error intercept
(Equation 5.7; i.e. the sum of the other error terms). The parameter sets that
make it to the top 50 for any weight 0 ≤ ϕ ≤ 25 are plotted in red. The dashed line
separates the cluster that performs well in all areas but slope error from the cluster
that yields lower slope errors but poorer performance in others. The special parameter
set θϕ is identified with a cross.

67

1.0
0.5

Unweighted Slope Error

1.5

2.0

Error Space for Any Top 50 Parameter Sets

15

20

25

30

Error Without Slope

Figure 5.4: Those parameter sets that make it to the top 50 for any weight 0 ≤ ϕ ≤ 25
(the red points in Figure 5.3). Slope error (Equation 5.5) is plotted against the total
error intercept (Equation 5.7; i.e. the sum of the other error terms). The dashed line
separates the cluster that performs well in all areas but slope error from the cluster
that yields lower slope errors but poorer performance in others. The special parameter
set θϕ is identified with a cross.
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Figure 5.5: Figure 5.2 recolored to demonstrate the two clusters separated by the
dashed line in Figures 5.3 & 5.4.
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Figure 5.6: Estimated probability density functions for each free parameter. Red
indicates the cluster that performs better in terms of slope. Blue indicates the cluster
that performs best in the other areas, disregarding slope error.

70

form and continuous form, respectively, Figure 5.6 essentially portrays the relative
frequency of a particular parameter value in the best fitting parameter sets, and
Figure 5.7 depicts the values for which a particular parameter are best for a given
ϕ. They mostly tell the same story; in the case of the inhibition decay parameter,
not only does the distribution of best fitting values shift toward higher values with
increased ϕ (Figure 5.6a), but Figure 5.7a demonstrates that the best values for this
parameter (γd = 5) also shift toward higher values as greater confidence is placed
upon the regression. Contrast this trend with the latency exponent parameter, which
is distributed more narrowly around lower values for the sets that survive longer in
the top as ϕ increases (Figure 5.6c), but strongly favor a higher value in terms of total
fit (f = 1.0; Figure 5.7c).
From this analysis, two parameter sets of interest emerge. The combination
that dominates a major portion of the error functions (indicated by the lowermost
line in Figure 5.2 and by the cross in Figures 5.3 & 5.4) is hereby denoted θϕ and
represents a moderate weighting of the regression of mean span on mean CL relative
to the other DVs. The parameter set with the least T0 reflects the hypothesis that
the trend between span and CL does not need to be directly selected for (i.e. ϕ = 0)
and that fitting to the DVs contributing to this relationship alone will be sufficient
for recovering it. This parameter set will be denoted θ0 . A third parameter set is
of interest because it allows for the reverse inference probed by θ0 . This set, hereby
denoted θRM SE , reflects the conviction that the relationship between span and CL
found in the human data is all that matters. This set minimizes the root mean square
error between the model’s mean span scores and the spans predicted by applying the
regression model of the human data to the model’s mean CL scores (Equation 5.8).
Specific parameter values for each θ set can be found in Table 5.1. Correlations among
error metrics and fit measures are provided in Table 5.2. It is noteworthy that T0 is
much more strongly correlated with RT, TPT, and accuracy measures than with span,
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Figure 5.7: Parameter frequencies for the 50 best fitting parameter sets as a function
of slope weight. The rank of each set is depicted by the opacity of its plotting character
with darker points indicating relatively better fitting parameter sets.
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Table 5.1: Parameter values associated with
best model fits
Parameter Set

R

γd

η

β

θ0
θϕ

13
5
9

4
5
5

3
3
2

9
9
9

θRM SE

f

F

0.1 0.1
0.1 0.3
0.1 0.3

Table 5.2: Misfit measure correlations
1
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

Span Error
RT Error
TPT Error
Accuracy Error
Slope Error
T0
RMSE

2

3

4

0.23
0.15 0.82
0.16 0.60 0.90
0.45 −0.04 −0.12 −0.15
0.54 0.80 0.90 0.86
0.95 0.25 0.28 0.31

5

6

0.06
0.44

0.62

while the RMSE score is more sensitive to the span and slope errors than the RT,
TPT, and accuracy errors. The performance of each set of interest is compared to
human performance in Figures 5.8–5.22.
v
u 6 
2

u1 X
1
t
RM SE =
· CLi · b̂i + âi
s̄i −
2 i=1
6900

(5.8)

While Figures 5.8–5.22 showcase the correspondence between model and human
DV means, it remains to be seen whether the variance produced by the model matches
that observed in the human data. Table 5.3 provides the results of a series of F -tests
to accompany these figures. It is noteworthy that the model tends to be less variable
than the human data in terms of RT and TPT over span or slope. Additionally, the
model grows less variable than the human data with increased emphasis on fitting the
regression of span on CL; the set θRM SE produces results that are significantly less
variable than the human data across the board.
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Figure 5.8: Comparison of model performance to human performance with respect to
mean span using the θ0 parameterization.
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Figure 5.9: Comparison of model performance to human performance with respect to
mean RT using the θ0 parameterization.
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Figure 5.10: Comparison of model performance to human performance with respect
to mean TPT using the θ0 parameterization.
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Figure 5.11: Comparison of model performance to human performance with respect
to mean accuracy using the θ0 parameterization.
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Figure 5.12: Comparison of model performance to human performance with respect
to mean span regression on cognitive load using the θ0 parameterization.
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Figure 5.13: Comparison of model performance to human performance with respect
to mean span using the θϕ parameterization.
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Figure 5.14: Comparison of model performance to human performance with respect
to mean RT using the θϕ parameterization.
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Figure 5.15: Comparison of model performance to human performance with respect
to mean TPT using the θϕ parameterization.

81

0.6
0.4

8
:L
el

6
M
od

:L
el

M
od

el
od

:L
an
um

M

oc

at

:L

io

4

n

el
:P
8
od

M

el
:P
6

4
M

od

:P
el

M
od

H

H

um

an

:P
ar

ity

0.0

0.2

Proportion of Correct Responses

0.8

1.0

Accuracy

Figure 5.16: Comparison of model performance to human performance with respect
to mean accuracy using the θϕ parameterization.
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Figure 5.17: Comparison of model performance to human performance with respect
to mean span regression on cognitive load using the θϕ parameterization.

83

8

WM Span
Model

P8

L4

4
0

2

Group Span

6

Human

P4

P6

L6

L8

Experimental Condition

Figure 5.18: Comparison of model performance to human performance with respect
to mean span using the θRM SE parameterization.
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Figure 5.19: Comparison of model performance to human performance with respect
to mean RT using the θRM SE parameterization.
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Figure 5.20: Comparison of model performance to human performance with respect
to mean TPT using the θRM SE parameterization.
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Figure 5.21: Comparison of model performance to human performance with respect
to mean accuracy using the θRM SE parameterization.
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Figure 5.22: Comparison of model performance to human performance with respect
to mean span regression on cognitive load using the θRM SE parameterization.
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Table 5.3: F -tests
Condition
Measure

θ0

Task

Pace

θϕ

θRM SE

F

p

F

p

F

p

Parity

4
6
8

0.59
1.49
0.47

.871
.145
.943

0.44
1.89
0.45

.957
.048
.955

2.42
11.82
4.39

.010
< .001
< .001

Location

4
6
8

0.79
0.43
0.84

.686
.964
.628

0.30
0.27
0.78

.994
.996
.692

3.44
3.74
7.50

< .001
< .001
< .001

Parity

4
6
8

14.04
5.43
2.19

< .001
< .001
.020

6.48
5.07
6.29

< .001
< .001
< .001

79.88
22.11
31.12

< .001
< .001
< .001

Location

4
6
8

2.17
1.34
6.58

.021
.213
< .001

6.02
4.02
9.11

< .001
< .001
< .001

271.11
84.96
82.87

< .001
< .001
< .001

Parity

4
6
8

10.37
4.12
0.21

< .001
< .001
.999

4.26
7.65
0.54

< .001
< .001
.901

37.23
24.05
11.05

< .001
< .001
< .001

Location

4
6
8

1.70
2.73
1.99

.081
.004
.036

4.62
9.90
0.89

< .001
< .001
.580

323.72
66.57
90.29

< .001
< .001
< .001

0.89
0.79

.655
.347

0.77
0.43

.307
.002

4.84
2.90

< .001
< .001

Span

RT

TPT

Slope

Parity
Location

Note. F < 1 indicates that the model is more variable than the human data.
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5.3

Parametric Effects on Components of Model Misfit
To further explore the contribution of each parameter to model misfit, I conducted

a series of multiple linear regressions for each error measure using the six free
model parameters as predictors. I provide visualizations of the significant effects
in Figures 5.23–5.30, showing the average difference between the model and human
data for each of the six experimental conditions. Error bars indicate the standard
p
2
2
error of this difference: SEM −H = SEM
+ SEH
. For simplicity I use the value from
the θϕ set for marginalized parameters rather than aggregating over all parameter
combinations.

5.3.1

Span

The negative interaction of the inhibition decay parameter γd and the base-level
constant β suggests that the model fits significantly better in terms of span with greater
temporal inhibition and larger base-level activation, B = −0.65, t(15618) = −2.56,
p = .011. The three-way interaction between these two parameters and the episodic
selectivity parameter η approached significance, B = 0.12, t(15618) = 1.95, p = .051;
however, speculative examination of this three-way interaction may help to better
characterize the relationship between the inhibition decay parameter and the base-level
constant. At the lowest level of the episodic selectivity parameter examined (η = 2;
Figure 5.23), the inhibition decay parameter and base-level constant clearly interact
such that mean span increases with increased inhibition decay only for higher levels of
the base-level constant. At lower to middle values (2 < η ≤ 4; Figures 5.24–5.25), the
interaction between the inhibition decay parameter and base-level constant appears
to become nonlinear with mean span increasing for extreme values of the base-level
constant (i.e. β = 1, 9) while middle values yield relatively lower mean spans. However,
this trend only holds for lower to middle values of the inhibition decay parameter
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(γd ≤ 4), after which the dominance of greater β reemerges before dropping off itself.
At larger values of the episodic selectivity parameter (η > 4; Figures 5.26–5.27), the
influence of both the inhibition decay parameter and the base-level constant become
muddled so that any effect of either on mean span is impossible to determine.

5.3.2

RT

The latency factor parameter F significantly contributed to RT error, B = 15.04,
t(15618) = 3.11, p = .002. The nearly significant interaction with the base-level
constant (B = −1.65, t(15618) = −1.95, p = .051) reflects a tradeoff between these
parameters. While the effect of F dominantly increases mean RTs beyond that
observed in the human data by increasing retrieval latencies, the effect of β counters
this through an inverse relationship on retrieval latencies, possibly explaining the
crossover at lower values of F (Figure 5.28).

5.3.3

TPT

The latency factor parameter alone significantly contributed to TPT error, B =
31.22, t(15618) = 3.93, p < .001. Inspection of Figure 5.29 reveals that the increased
error is caused by a massive decrease in mean TPT as F increases.

5.3.4

Accuracy

The regression results concerning accuracy were very similar to those for TPT
error. The latency factor parameter significantly contributed to accuracy error,
B = 35.95, t(15618) = 5.11, p < .001. Similar to the previous finding, accuracy
decreases considerably as F increases (Figure 5.30).
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Figure 5.23: Difference between the model’s and the humans’ mean span scores as
a function of the temporal inhibition decay parameter and the base-level constant
across experimental conditions when η = 2. Error bars indicate the standard error of
the difference in means. The horizontal line at 0 represents a perfect fit to the human
data.
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Figure 5.24: Difference between the model’s and the humans’ mean span scores as
a function of the temporal inhibition decay parameter and the base-level constant
across experimental conditions when η = 3. Error bars indicate the standard error of
the difference in means. The horizontal line at 0 represents a perfect fit to the human
data.
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Figure 5.25: Difference between the model’s and the humans’ mean span scores as
a function of the temporal inhibition decay parameter and the base-level constant
across experimental conditions when η = 4. Error bars indicate the standard error of
the difference in means. The horizontal line at 0 represents a perfect fit to the human
data.
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Figure 5.26: Difference between the model’s and the humans’ mean span scores as
a function of the temporal inhibition decay parameter and the base-level constant
across experimental conditions when η = 5. Error bars indicate the standard error of
the difference in means. The horizontal line at 0 represents a perfect fit to the human
data.
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Figure 5.27: Difference between the model’s and the humans’ mean span scores as
a function of the temporal inhibition decay parameter and the base-level constant
across experimental conditions when η = 6. Error bars indicate the standard error of
the difference in means. The horizontal line at 0 represents a perfect fit to the human
data.
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Figure 5.28: Difference between the model’s and the humans’ mean RT as a function of
the latency factor parameter and the base-level constant across experimental conditions.
Error bars indicate the standard error of the difference in means. The horizontal line
at 0 represents a perfect fit to the human data.
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Figure 5.29: Difference between the model’s and the humans’ mean TPT as a function
of the latency factor parameter across experimental conditions. Error bars indicate
the standard error of the difference in means. The horizontal line at 0 represents a
perfect fit to the human data.
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Figure 5.30: Difference between the model’s and the humans’ mean accuracy as
a function of the latency factor parameter across experimental conditions. Error
bars indicate the standard error of the difference in means. The horizontal line at 0
represents a perfect fit to the human data.
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5.3.5

Slope

Overall, the error behind the mean differences in regression slopes was much
greater than for the other measures. No parameters were found to be significant
predictors of slope error.

5.3.6

RMSE

In addition to the error measures directly associated with each dependent variable,
the root mean squared error used to determine θRM SE (Equation 5.8) can also be
regressed onto the free parameters. Rather than treating span, TPT, and slope errors
separately, this error indicates how well the model fits the human span function
proposed by Barrouillet et al. (2007, see also Barrouillet & Camos, 2015; Barrouillet,
Portrat, & Camos, 2011). Similar to what was found with span error, there was a
slight negative interaction of the inhibition decay parameter γd and the base-level
constant β, suggesting that this measure primarily corresponds to the model’s ability
to fit the span data despite incorporating TPT and slope information, B = −0.08,
t(15618) = −2.72, p = .023 (Figure 5.31).
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Figure 5.31: Interaction between the inhibition decay parameter and the base-level
constant on the root mean squared error of the ability of the human regression function
to predict the model’s span from its cognitive load.
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6

Discussion

I have successfully modeled the results of Barrouillet et al. (2007). The model
emulates human performance in both recall and distractor tasks while expanding
ACT-R to implement the first computational TBRS architecture. To accentuate this
achievement, I next review the best fitting parameter sets designated by each approach
to cumulative error assessment. These results are the product of a coarse grid search
meant to aid in the understanding of general patterns of behavior over a generous
range of the parameters hypothesized to affect the model’s performance. It is a proviso
of discrete parameter optimization that the “best” parameter combination found is
likely not the best possible parameterization of the model because the parameters
are actually continuous, not discrete, variables. Likely the optimal parameter values
lie somewhere between those evaluated. Nevertheless, examination of these sets as a
whole reveals the peak limitations of the model, while comparisons between the sets
themselves characterizes performance along the Pareto frontier (Figure 5.4), as fitting
emphasis moves from matching individual areas of performance independently (i.e.
θ0 ) to capturing their holistic interaction (i.e. θRM SE ).

6.1

Best Fitting Parameter Sets Based on Each Cumulative
Metric
The parameter set θ0 , which is the best fitting parameterization of the model

when regression slope is not explicitly selected for, captures the effect of task-type well;
however, with the exception of TPT, fails to produce much of an effect of distractor
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pace. This is particularly clear in Figure 5.8 where the invariance of mean span with
respect to CL results in relatively flat gradients in Figure 5.12.
The parameter set θϕ , which is the best fitting parameterization of the model when
an acceptable regression slope is expressly mandated, replicates both experimental
effects slightly better than θ0 , albeit somewhat weakly in the case of RT. It is much
better at fitting the regression of mean span on mean CL, almost perfectly in the parity
condition despite consistently underperforming in terms of span. This parameterization
has trouble fitting distractor response accuracy, noticeably underperforming in the
parity condition. This is likely caused by θϕ ’s relatively low reward parameter (Rϕ = 5)
compared to the other “best” sets (R0 = 13; RRM SE = 9).
The parameter set θRM SE , which is the parameterization of the model that
minimizes the RMSE between model performance and Barrouillet et al.’s (2007)
regression of mean span on mean CL, similarly reproduces the effects of task and pace.
It overestimates mean RT and mean TPT in every condition, and, like θ0 and θϕ , it
tends to underestimate mean span. The direction of misfit with regard to span and
TPT explains the diminished effect of CL (i.e. flatter regression lines with respect to
the human data) in Figure 5.22. Although the magnitude of this effect for θRM SE
is less than the magnitude of the effect in the parity condition for θϕ , θRM SE does
what the other “best” sets fail to do: it replicates the central result of the original
experiment. The parallel regression lines in Figure 5.22 would be interpreted according
to Barrouillet et al. (2007) as demonstrating little effect of task type once CL is
controlled.
It is not clear why the model grows increasingly less variable than the human
data with increased emphasis on fitting the regression of span on CL (i.e. from θ0
to θϕ to θRM SE ; Table 5.3). One reason may be that if there is little variance in
terms of RT, and thereby TPT and CL, then according to Equation 1.3 there should
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be less variance in terms of span. Variance in RT may be reduced in the model if it
has settled into a single response strategy or pattern; therefore, inordinate procedural
learning may be responsible. Alternatively, the simplified approach to modeling the
response process, where the model cannot retrieve erroneous information and can only
respond incorrectly by guessing, likely reduces variability in an unrealistic way. More
work is required to determine the source of this discrepancy.

6.2

Parametric Effects on Model Behavior
While Figures 5.8–5.22 provide face validity, the more worthwhile contributions of

the model come from its quantitative mapping of psychological constructs to behavior,
and these parametric effects and specific recommendations for their instantiation in
future work are discussed next.
I expected a three-way interaction of inhibition, temporal association, and baseline
activation on mean span because of the formulation of the activation equation
(Equation 3.1). Although this interaction just failed to reach statistical significance, the
lower order interaction of inhibition and baseline activation did significantly contribute
to misfit. Naively, the parameterization of the model that will produce the largest
mean spans should have higher values for each of these three parameters because
increased inhibition biases retrieval toward less recently retrieved items, increased
temporal association biases retrieval toward items near the position of the most
recently retrieved item, and baseline activation offsets the penalties of both. However,
the optimal parameterization should balance the temporal inhibition and episodic
similarity gradients in a way that promotes a steady refreshing cycle. Looking at
Figure 5.23, in which the effect of temporal association is small, the interaction of
inhibition and baseline activation resembles the performance of a primacy gradient
model because, without the chaining-like influence of item similarity, list order is
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preserved through the relative activation of each item, and greater inhibition produces
a steeper primacy-like gradient that is able to resolve more items. As temporal
association increases, the influence of episodic similarity becomes more pronounced,
and the previously primacy gradient-like behavior of the inhibition and baseline
activation interaction is disrupted because now the convoluted temporal inhibition
and episodic similarity penalties must be coordinated. Optimal balance of these
penalties should produce peak performance. Currently, such an equilibrium cannot
be determined analytically because there are too many degrees of freedom; however,
serial position errors (discussed later) could be used to determine episodic similarity a
priori, which would in turn make the solution to this interaction more tractable.
The reduced effect of retrieval latency scaling on RT error in conditions with
more inter-letter distractors (Figure 5.28) indicates some type of learning process. The
model may be learning to respond quicker through production compilation, whereby
fewer retrievals would occur and mean RT would become less dependent on retrieval
latency in general, or it may be learning to avoid retrievals altogether and to guess
more frequently. Evidence from TPT and accuracy errors (Figures 5.29 & 5.30,
respectively) suggests that the latter may be closer to the truth. Not only does the
number of learning trials increase with the number of distractors, but the length of
time during which a response may be made also decreases. This is why mean TPT
increases with mean RT as retrieval latency scaling increases in the four-distractor
conditions, but it fails to keep up in the additional distractor conditions. Because
TPT is the sum of the RTs to distractors following a given target, only a failure to
respond can produce the disassociation between RT and TPT. If the model fails to
respond on a given trial, no RT is available to count toward the TPT, and the model
receives zero reward (as if it had made an incorrect response). This biases the model
away from the long retrievals that led to the timeout and toward guessing. Learning
to guess when retrieval latencies are long has multiple consequences. First, the effect
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of retrieval latency scaling is diminished as the flat, minimum time associated with
guessing becomes more prevalent. Second, if the model guesses incorrectly, it will
then be forced to refrain from guessing on the next trial to ensure it learns the correct
production sequence, as part of the strategy for modeling the speed-accuracy tradeoff
(Peebles & Bothell, 2004). However, if retrievals always take too long because of the
choice of scaling (F ), then the model is doomed to timeout again in a vicious cycle
that tanks performance with respect to both TPT and accuracy. Furthermore, the
decrease in accuracy below chance performance (Figure 5.30) is unlikely to have been
caused purely by guessing; a substantial number of nonresponses are required.
No parameters were found to significantly affect slope error, but it is unlikely that
this is because none of the free parameters contribute to the linear effect of CL. The
interaction of inhibition and baseline activation on RMSE demonstrates this. The null
finding can more likely be explained by the aggregation of individual results into three
means for each regression of span on CL. As previously discussed, such a reduction
in data introduces a large amount of uncertainty to the estimate of each regression
coefficient (e.g. more potential lines can be drawn through three points than fifty).
One solution to this problem would be to use individual, rather than group average,
scores in the regression, but then repeated measures would be required in order to
estimate the variance of the individual scores. Another strategy would be to design
an experiment with more induced levels of CL so as to sample the full range of CL.
Not only would this method yield more points to which to aggregate, but it could
also reveal previously unknown characteristics of the span function. For example,
TBRS predicts that span is a completely linear function of CL; however, there is no
evidence to believe this prediction would hold true at extreme levels of CL. Intuitively,
the mean span function seems far more likely to become exponential at the tails (i.e.
as CL approaches 0 or 1) than to remain linear. Further, one could combine both
techniques and estimate the effect of CL using hierarchical regression.
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6.3

Recommendations for Future Parameterization
I include this section mainly for those proficient in ACT-R who might wish to

implement the model presented here in their own work. Casual readers may ignore
specific values as they do not provide additional comprehension beyond that presented
in the previous section; however, their discussion does prime certain topics for follow-up
investigation.
The reward parameter R did not substantially affect model fitness. Upon review,
it appears that 9 may be the minimum value needed to yield sufficient accuracy
(without regard to other parameters) while higher values do not produce increased
performance.
Multiple methods (e.g., analysis of T (ϕ), multiple regression of span error and
RMSE, and inspection of θ sets) agree that larger values for the temporal inhibition
decay parameter, approximately γd = 5, produce better mean spans and regression
upon CL slopes.
An optimal range for the episodic selectivity parameter could not be established
from this analysis, although the θ sets suggest it may be nearer to η = 3. In future
studies, this parameter may be determined more directly through the analysis of
transposition errors (see comments regarding serial memory later in Discussion).
Overall, larger values for the base-level constant are favored because they allow
greater temporal inhibition and episodic selectivity penalties to be applied. Values
greater than 9 may need to be explored in the future.
Multiple regression results suggest that the latency factor parameter is positively
related to RT error, TPT error, and accuracy error. Inspection of Figures 5.28–5.30
suggests the best fitting value of this parameter, which represents the maximum
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retrieval time, to be approximately F = 0.3 seconds. This value is in agreement
with the θ sets and the conclusions of the analysis of T (ϕ), namely that F = 0.3 is
associated with improved slope fits.
Because the latency exponent parameter, which scales the latency of a chunk’s
retrieval to its instantaneous activation, was not found to significantly affect any
measure of model misfit, future applications of this model may reasonably fix this
parameter at its default value (f = 1). However, because the θ sets and mixed
evidence from the analysis of T (ϕ) seem to favor lower values, particularly f = 0.1, it
may be worth exploring an interesting alternative specification of the model. Through
various memory-loading paradigms, Vergauwe, Camos, and Barrouillet (2014) and
Vergauwe and Cowan (2014) have demonstrated that processing time increases an
average of 50 ms or 35-40 ms, respectively, per item in short-term memory. Vergauwe
and Cowan (2014) go so far as to suggest that this rate corresponds with 40 Hz gamma
oscillations observed in cortical and hippocampal tissue. Such a constant refreshing
rate could be tested in the current model by modifying it so that refreshing retrievals
are forced to take a fixed amount of time, analogous to f = 0. Given Vergauwe et
al.’s (2014) results, 50 ms, the default action time in ACT-R (the amount of time it
takes for a production to fire), is probably a good place to begin such an investigation.
Furthermore, fixing the latency of refreshing retrievals at a constant interval greatly
simplifies the activation equation (Equation 3.1) because the retrieval times of each
chunk tj become determinable instead of chaotic. The activation of each item in a list
could potentially be computed analytically, and small-scale simulations could be used
to set the γd , η, and β parameters of the more complex ACT-R model.
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6.4

Shortcomings and Assumptions of the Model

6.4.1

Reward and Utility Learning

Two misconceptions about reward in ACT-R impeded my progress in model
development. Utility, like activation, in ACT-R is measured on an interval scale; the
difference between two utilities matters, but zero utility does not imply a lack of
utility. I originally tried to apply a ratio scale to utility, treating productions with
positive utility as likely to lead to positive outcomes, productions with negative utility
as likely to lead to negative outcomes, and zero utility to describe neutral productions.
I had one nonzero reward parameter that was awarded for correct responses, and its
opposite was awarded for incorrect responses. In the current experiment where there
are only two alternatives, a correct response and an incorrect response, this mistake
by itself would effectively only cause the reward parameter to scale at twice its current
rate (i.e. when incorrect responses receive zero reward), although the interpretation
of the parameter would be somewhat different.
The second early mistake I made stemmed from the first. Because the reward
a production receives is discounted by the amount of time between when it fires
and when the reward is triggered, I realized that a correct response needed to be
awarded with at least its latency in order for every production that led to it to receive
nonnegative reward. However, in the present experiment, some conditions allow more
time than others in which to respond, which means that in order to preserve a neutral
zero point (i.e. ratio scaling), more reward would be available to some conditions
than in others. In order to equate the reward received across conditions, I set the
reward parameter to the RT on each trial. This initially made sense because longer
RTs indicated extended effort, which should result in greater reward/penalty for
correct/incorrect responses, but it was disastrous because it caused the model to learn
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productions that led to slower, not faster responses. Additionally, although compiled
productions would still learn to overtake their parents, utility learning (Equation 3.4)
would then adjust their utilities until they were equal, causing the slower response
path and the faster response path to be chosen with equal probability.

6.4.2

Metacognition and Feedback

Barrouillet et al. (2007) reported a speed-accuracy tradeoff in the human responses
to distractor items. In order to model this, I sought a method used in other ACT-R
models to produce such an effect. Peebles and Bothell’s (2004) technique, which I
implemented in my model, uses the ACT-R procedural learning system to bias the
model toward either a slow but accurate strategy or a quick but less accurate strategy.
This method requires some form of feedback to guide utility learning, but Barrouillet
et al. only provided their participants with feedback during the training phase of the
study. Without trial-by-trial data, which would have revealed any learning effects over
trials, I was forced to assume whether procedural learning, necessary for Peebles and
Bothell’s technique, took place only during training or over the course of the entire
experiment. Choosing the latter, I needed to give the model a way to generate its own
feedback, which I achieved through “metacognition”.
Although a metacognitive strategy solved my missing feedback problem, it is
clear from post-analysis that metacognition introduced its own issues. First, it may
remove any incentive for responding prematurely because the model must always make
every retrieval necessary for determining the correct response so that it can reward
itself, which undermines the faster strategy in Peebles and Bothell’s (2004) technique.
Secondly, the retrievals in service of metacognition, potentially taking place after
the model initiates a response, would not be represented in the RT-based proxy of
cognitive load used in my and Barrouillet et al.’s (2007) analyses, despite certainly
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contributing to the cognitive load experienced by the model. This could pose a serious
problem when interpreting my results. Underestimating cognitive load may partly
explain the model’s overall underperformance in terms of mean span. It may also
contribute to response lapses.
Not only would the removal of metacognition produce better agreement between
proxies of cognitive load and actual cognitive load, it would restore a real incentive for
guessing because faster responses would be rewarded sooner. Crucially, this approach
would entirely depend on whether the training phase was sufficiently long enough
for procedural learning to produce the speed-accuracy tradeoff across conditions
observed in the human data. The trial-by-trial responses in a new experiment should
be sufficient for resolving this decision, but it could be explored using the current
model and data. A new experiment could be designed to test for metacognition by
manipulating whether feedback is provided. If the human participants employ such
a metacognitive strategy when experimenter-provided feedback is unavailable, then
lower mean spans should be observed in the condition without feedback because the
additional retrievals will induce relatively more cognitive load than the condition with
experimenter-provided feedback.

6.4.3

Declarative Long-Term Memory

In early versions of the model, before I modified the number of references to LTM
chunks to stabilize their base-level activation, the model treated the creation time
of these chunks as the moment the model was loaded (i.e. the very beginning of the
experiment), causing these chunks to have a base-level activation that was smoothly
decaying as opposed to stable. Failing to stabilize the activation of these chunks prior
to the onset of the experiment caused unwanted model behavior. Because activation
was no longer a linear function of the base-level constant β, the tradeoff between β
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and the retrieval latency scaling parameters made fitting the model tricky. Lower
values of β performed better because longer retrievals allowed for greater disparity in
RTs once the retrievals were obviated by production compilation, thus producing a
more pronounced speed-accuracy tradeoff across conditions; however, if β decreased
below some threshold, then the model would fail catastrophically by failing to retrieve
simple LTM chunks (e.g., the asterisk, numbers, or letters), akin to forgetting how to
read.
This anecdote highlights a prominent feature inherited by the model: ACT-R
has a unitary system of declarative memory. In contrast to other models of human
memory (notoriously Atkinson & Shiffrin, 1968, but more recently Baddeley, 2012),
which have separate systems for STM and LTM, my model blurs such a distinction.
The degree to which a memory is more long-term than short-term is related to the
frequency of its use in the past. In my model, what would be considered short-term
memories in the divided system view are simply memories that have not been retrieved
often enough to survive the decay experienced over an interval of interest. Because the
declarative memory module in ACT-R unmistakably instantiates LTM, some (such
as Anderson et al., 1996), working under the assumption of separate LTM and STM
systems, have interpreted the module buffers as representative of STM. My model
rejects using module buffers for storage and instead advocates the stronger view of
TBRS that buffers represent bottlenecks on the flow of information.

6.4.4

Serial Memory

Complex span tasks are designed to measure WMC, and the evidence in the
literature suggests that they do this by tapping into the ability to selectively control
attention (Chow & Conway, 2015; Conway et al., 2005). However, many assumptions
about list and order representation must be made in order to construct a model of
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WM, which theoretically is a separate construct. Doubtless, any model will have
to make assumptions about representation, but the dependence of complex span
performance on serial memory should lead one to question the degree to which a
WM model’s success can be attributed to the validity with which it captures the
workings of any real WM mechanism or to the quality of its assumptions about list and
order representation. One method commonly used in the literature for avoiding this
problem when measuring humans’ WM abilities in order to predict other constructs
(e.g. general intelligence) is to administer multiple WM tasks, such as binding and
updating tasks in addition to complex span tasks, and then use latent variable analysis
to gauge the common variance. Similarly, the robustness of WM models should be
assessed by determining their convergent validity across multiple tasks. My model
of TBRS is exceptionally suited for undertaking such a challenge because it was
developed using the ACT-R framework, and many studies have demonstrated that
ACT-R is capable of modeling a variety of different tasks. This is one future direction
in which to take my model that would be particularly interesting because TBRS was
developed around complex span tasks and to my knowledge has seen only limited
application to alternative classes of tasks.
Another way to address the validity of my model’s serial memory assumptions
is to evaluate serial position errors. Unfortunately, these data are not reported in
Barrouillet et al. (2007). Therefore, I did not make capturing such error patterns
a priority of my model. That being said, serial position errors are heavily utilized
throughout the serial memory literature for inferring list structure. A new dataset
that includes serial position errors from a study employing similar manipulations of
cognitive load would go a long way in further constraining my model. For example,
the episodic selectivity parameter η effectively governs the rate at which an item at
position x + 1 is retrieved over an item at position x + 2, etc. The rate at which
these transposition errors are found in human data could be used to a priori fix η.
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Furthermore, such a dataset would allow me to make a principled investigation into
Portrat and Lemaire’s (2014) claim that TBRS models with a focus of attention of
one item cannot produce recency effects.
Even without serial position data, there are some types of errors that my model
definitively cannot produce in its current form. Unless its activation somehow drops
below threshold, which is unlikely because it has the most opportunities to be refreshed
out of all the list items, the first item recalled will always be the first target in the list
because the first retrieval in the recall subroutine (Figure 3.7) specifically requests a
chunk explicitly marked as first. The model is also unable to make intrusion errors,
where an item from a previous list is erroneously recalled in the current list, because I
did not define a similarity function for list contexts. The partial-matching function
(Equation 3.2) could be expanded in future work to also include list contexts, but I
avoided this in the current model because it would require additional free parameters
to fit data I do not even have. Yet simply expanding partial-matching in this manner
would not be able to account for the finding that intrusions from prior lists tend to
maintain their relative position (Burgess & Hitch, 2006). This effect is commonly taken
as evidence for positional coding because encoding items with their absolute time of
encoding, which the model currently does, would not produce the same cross-position
similarities. However, one could imagine using a hierarchical memory structure where
the highest item is encoded with an absolute time, and items at each successively lower
level are recursively encoded with the relative time difference between their encoding
and the sum of their parents’ encodings (e.g., the list is encoded with context x; a
group within the list, created at time t, is encoded with context y = t − x; and an item
within that group, created at time u, is encoded with context z = u − (y + x); etc.).
Such a coding scheme would preserve within-list relative similarity while continuing to
use temporal, rather than ordinal, contextual information. Interestingly, this algorithm
is compatible with a theory that items are encoded in the brain with high-frequency
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neural oscillators and that the structure in which they are nested (e.g. the list context)
is encoded with neurons oscillating at lower, harmonic frequencies (Lisman & Idiart,
1995; Vergauwe & Cowan, 2014). It is also congruent with Farrell’s (2012) theory that
temporally similar items are spontaneously grouped into clusters.
Lastly, with regard to serial memory, there seems to be an implicit assumption in
the literature that requesting participants to “recall the items in the correct order” is
equivalent to asking them to “recall the items in the correct positions”, but the latter
request is actually a stronger case of the former. We know that different emphases in
instructions can influence how participants approach a task (e.g. speed/accuracy bias).
It may be the case that emphasizing item order may bias participants toward using a
chaining representation, and emphasizing item position may bias participants toward
using a positional coding representation. Failing to acknowledge this subtle difference
in task instructions may cause undue heterogeneity of variance from averaging over
different strategies, which would in turn make further theory development more
difficult. Computational modeling provides a means for testing this hypothesis in
future studies that manipulate subject instructions in such a way. Otherwise identical
models could be created that use chaining or positional coding, and the hypothesis
would be supported if they differ in their ability to fit each form of instructions.

6.4.5

Other Methodological Restrictions

The availability of only those group-level data reported in Barrouillet et al.
(2007) limited this project. Individual trial responses, necessary for determining serial
position errors, response lapse rates, and other alternative indices of performance that
could further constrain parameters, are no longer available (P. Barrouillet, personal
communication, February 4, 2015). That being said, the published data available
was sufficient for developing the model and exploring its behavior. It may even be
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adequate for investigating some proposed extensions of the model. Undoubtedly, a
new study must be conducted in order to robustly scrutinize the model, but in its
current state the model is able to suggest how such a study should be designed and to
predict how human participants will perform in it. Such a study should follow the
advice of Conway et al. (2005) and use partial-credit scoring because it is slightly
more reliable than all-or-nothing scoring, which Barrouillet et al. (2007) used. Because
I did not have access to their raw data, I scored my model as Barrouillet et al. did
in order to be consistent with their results, but a more reliable metric would reduce
variability in model performance. Partial-credit scoring would particularly benefit a
study of individual differences by yielding more stable individual scores.

6.5

Future Versions of the Model

6.5.1

Refreshing Strategies

In addition to the alternative versions of the model discussed above, a variety of
other implementations may be interesting to explore. The current refreshing strategy
of the model is appealing because it is simple and epiphenomenal. The order in which
items are refreshed is not explicitly specified, rather the next item to be refreshed
is selected based on its instantaneous activation, which is dependent on inhibition,
contextual association, and refreshing history. That being said, a number of different
explicit refreshing strategies could be experimented with. For example, Oberauer and
Lewandowsky (2011) describe trying out multiple refreshing strategies (i.e. with which
item to restart the refreshing loop after interruption). They found that restarting
the refreshing loop with the first item in the list worked best, followed closely by
continuing the loop with the last item refreshed. They comment that using the first
item in the list resulted in slightly more monotonic span/CL gradients than using
the last item refreshed. Anderson et al. (1998) used a strategy that randomly chose
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between rehearsing the current item displayed on screen and rehearsing the entire
list in order. My own simulations in R (Figure 6.1; R Development Core Team,
2008) suggest that this strategy, when used in conjunction with ACT-R’s base-level
learning mechanism, may be sufficient for producing the U-shaped serial position
curves Anderson et al. (1998) obtained. This is significant because Portrat and Lemaire
(2014) have challenged key assumptions of TBRS based on the difficulty of TBRS* to
match human serial position curves. The results of Anderson et al. (1998) suggest
that refreshing strategy, rather than an expanded focus of attention, may be sufficient
for producing recency and other serial position effects, leaving the original TBRS
specification intact.
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Figure 6.1: Simplified simulation of Anderson et al.’s (1998) model of immediate serial
recall constructed in R. Average activation of each item in lists of size 1-12 items after
1000 runs. For each item in the list, the model has one second to make four rehearsals.
For each rehearsal, the model is equally likely to choose one of two strategies. The first
strategy is to rehearse the item currently displayed on screen. The second strategy is
to rehearse the item in the position after the last item rehearsed. At all times, the
model retains a pointer to the last item rehearsed, excluding rehearsals initiated by
the first strategy. Characteristic U-shaped serial position gradients are caused by
earlier items benefiting most from the latter strategy, while later items benefit from
the relative recency with which they were rehearsed by the former strategy. Items in
the middle of the list suffer most because they are less likely than the early items to
be chosen by the latter strategy and because the former strategy will have rehearsed
them less recently than the later items.
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6.5.2

Individual Differences and the Fan Mechanism

Another potential direction for further exploration of the model is to reconsider
the role of the fan mechanism. I intentionally avoided this mechanism because it
divides spreading activation equally amongst the items in the list, and TBRS strongly
opposes such capacity sharing. That being said, the fan effect is an early premise of
ACT-R (Anderson, 1976, 2007; Pirolli & Anderson, 1985), and it would be worthwhile
to add this component back into the model, particularly because one parameter of
spreading activation, Wj , has been proposed as the source of individual differences
in WMC (Lovett, Reder, & Lebiere, 1999). Considering Unsworth and Engle’s
(2006) suggestion that the ability to efficiently use temporal-contextual information is
responsible for individual differences in WMC and the similarity between spreading
activation (Equation 6.1) and a rearranged form (Equation 6.2) of partial-matching
from my model (Equation 3.2), one might suspect the episodic selectivity parameter η
to account for individual differences in WMC.

Si =

X

Wj (ς − ln m)

(6.1)

j



|i − requested |
ξ
Pi = η
− ln 1 +
η
ω


h
Let ς, ξ = 0 and substitute the quantity x for 1 +

|i −requested |
ω

(6.2)

i

, and one can see

that, when assuming one source of activation (e.g. list context),

Si = W (0 − ln m)

(6.3)

Pi = η (0 − ln x)

(6.4)

is analogous to
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and that η is functionally equivalent to Wj . Further studies are required, but a
comprehensive interpretation of my model suggests that cognitive load explains
task-driven, between-subjects constraints on WMC, while η explains within-subjects
constraints on individual WMC.
In models of list memory that utilize continuous refreshing or rehearsal techniques,
the boost in activation from the fan mechanism at the time of recall is negligible
compared to that from base-level learning. It has the greatest influence upon retrieval
for very short lists and during the maintenance of the first few items in longer lists,
but only when very few refreshing retrievals are allowed. These effects, in addition
to TBRS’s emphasis on temporal constraints, suggest that the fan mechanism is not
necessary to produce the list length effect. However, experiments designed to elicit the
fan effect without invoking list length (e.g. sentence recognition paradigms; Anderson
& Reder, 1999) indicate that the fan effect is likely a component of associative memory.
The present model suggests a role for the fan mechanism in serial memory. The model
can run into a problem where early items, particularly the first two items, experience a
lot of temporal inhibition because they are always likely to have been recently retrieved.
This excessive penalty causes refreshing retrievals to fail; thereby, forcing the model
to wait for the full duration of the latency factor (F ) before another retrieval can be
attempted. Such failures drastically reduce the number of refreshing retrievals that
can be attempted during a period of maintenance. Conversely, late items in the list,
which are refreshed less frequently because there are more items to refresh before
their next turn, experience very little temporal inhibition by comparison. Attempts
to minimize the excessive inhibition of early items by simply lowering the inhibition
decay parameter γd will further reduce the effect of inhibition at longer list lengths,
introducing extra transposition errors and reducing observed span because the early
items have now built up too much activation. The solution to these problems is a
bonus to activation that decreases with list length (or a penalty that increases with
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list length, depending on implementation), which is exactly what the fan mechanism
provides. The parameterization that approximately equates the rates of change in fan
bonus and inhibition penalty over list length will ensure that the influence of temporal
inhibition upon maintenance is constant across list length.
Interestingly, a model that implements such a system would predict that individual
differences in WMC arise from the ability to appropriately balance two factors that
have independently been proposed in the literature to explain such differences: the
previously mentioned strength of association weight Wj , which is meant to represent
the amount of activation that can be divided amongst associated chunks (Lovett et
al., 1999), and efficient use of temporal-contextual information, represented in the
current model as temporal inhibition and episodic association. These parameters could
be empirically disassociated by independently manipulating target list length and
inter-target pacing. Individual differences might be caused by inappropriate weighting
of episodic association (η) or strength of temporal inhibition (γd ), insufficient sensitivity
to inhibition or reduced plasticity in modulation of compensating attentional strength
(Wj ; or simply ceiling effects in the attentional capacity available). Future work in
modeling serial recall paradigms will not only be able to validate this compensation
hypothesis but will also be able to identify which mechanism(s) (i.e. parameter)
covaries with observed individual differences by systematically manipulating each
parameter.

6.5.3

Temporal Decay Versus Representation-Based Interference

The assumption of temporal decay is fundamental to TBRS, and careful experimental
manipulations have been used to provide evidence for it over representation-based
interference (Barrouillet et al., 2012; Barrouillet, Portrat, Vergauwe, et al., 2011;
Lewandowsky & Oberauer, 2009). While ACT-R also assumes temporal decay in
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base-level learning (Equation 1.6), this choice was not originally a strong assumption
of the theory. Indeed, early works suggest that the critical variable for decay could
be the number of intervening events (Anderson et al., 1998: footnote 3). It would
require modifying the declarative module, but my ACT-R model of TBRS could be
used to directly compare these two competing hypotheses by implementing each into
otherwise identical models and then comparing their respective fits to human data.

6.5.4

Non-Attentional Mechanisms of Maintenance

Recent research has investigated the possibility that the TBRS conception of WM
is supported by the coordination of separate attentional refreshing and articulatory
rehearsal loops (Barrouillet & Camos, 2015; Camos & Barrouillet, 2014; Vergauwe
et al., 2010). The version of the model presented here does not use articulatory
rehearsal; all maintenance is performed using attentional refreshing. However, because
participants in Barrouillet et al. (2007) were not under articulatory suppression, it is
reasonable to believe that participants did engage in rehearsal. I developed the code
necessary to implement three WM strategies: attentional refreshing alone, articulatory
rehearsal alone, and coordinated refreshing and rehearsal; despite only evaluating the
model with attentional refreshing alone. I look forward to assessing the other two
maintenance strategies in future work.

6.5.5

Adaptive Maintenance

The model has identified one place where the TBRS theory can be strengthened.
Whereas TBRS expanded task-switching models to allow refreshing to take place
during breaks in processing within tasks as well as between tasks, my efforts suggest
that this is not common, at least for simple tasks like Barrouillet et al. (2007). Modeling
each step of the distractor task reveals that retrieval takes longer than any other
operation in the processing chain. Thus, as soon as one retrieval is completed, the
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system needs to make another processing-related retrieval, and there is no free time
with which to perform maintenance. I speculate that in more complicated processing
episodes, where the prolonged obstruction of the central bottleneck makes it likely
that all to-be-remembered items are lost to decay, humans insert endogenous breaks in
processing so as to perform maintenance. Because the intermediate processing-related
information needs be retained until after this burst of maintenance, it too will need
to be refreshed. The dynamics of this interplay, and people’s ability to adaptively
strategize their refreshing process, are worthy of further study.

6.6

Summary of Predictions
This work provides additional support for the predictions of the TBRS model,

that variations in WM span can be explained in terms of variations in cognitive load.
Going beyond Oberauer and Lewandowsky (2011), I have demonstrated that when
situated within a larger cognitive architecture, ACT-R, a computational model of
TBRS is also capable of predicting accuracy and RT in the distracting task.
The current model indicates that greater WMC is caused by increased self-inhibition
and better temporal acuity. Inhibition is a key component of cognitive control (Juvina
& Taatgen, 2009), which has itself been previously linked to WM (Conway et al.,
2005). Likewise, the ability to more effectively use temporal context has also been
suggested to be associated with WM span (Unsworth & Engle, 2006). Future work
may reveal individual differences in WMC that reflect variation in the parameters
controlling these mechanisms.
The model suggests that additional reward pressure in the distractor task would
not improve performance in terms of RT or span. For this experiment at least, it
is likely that motivation is already at ceiling for such simple tasks (i.e. parity and
location judgments).
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By fixing the model’s retrieval threshold at zero, I was able to coerce ACT-R’s
retrieval latency factor parameter to represent maximum retrieval time. Parameter
fitting suggested this limit to be approximately 300 ms. Electrophysiological studies
using event-related potentials may be able to corroborate this prediction.
The model makes additional predictions that were not directly tested here. While
the model does demonstrate a linear relationship between cognitive load and WM
span, I only evaluated the six levels of cognitive load in Barrouillet et al. (2007).
Further simulation of other distractor paces will make stronger predictions about the
form of this function, including at extreme values of cognitive load.
The interplay of decay and inhibition in the model hints at a possible optimal
refreshing pace. On one hand, if refreshing is too frequent, items may have not
recovered from inhibition by the time of their next attempted retrieval. On the other
hand, if refreshing is too slow, then gratuitous decay may occur resulting in inefficient
maintenance. The optimal pace balances these forces such that the most information
possible to retain is preserved. Assuming such an ideal rate exists, then it would be
advantageous for the cognitive system to have some means of regulating it. Future
research is needed to identify this proposed mechanism.
The model’s partial matching function (Equation 3.2) compares the temporal
context of each target item when selecting the next item to refresh. Just as two items
that were encoded closely in time are likely to be recalled in succession, the overall
proximity of each item determines the main transposition error rate. Because items
are essentially encoded with the time of their presentation, this predicts that the order
of items is more likely to be confused the more quickly they are presented. Irregular
target presentation rates could be used to test for selective induction of serial position
errors. This prediction only holds in the current model if parameters are static –
adaptive modulation of inhibition or temporal association scaling (ω) precludes this
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assessment. Pure positional coding models (i.e. where each item is encoded with its
ordinal position) would also predict no increase in transposition errors.
I identified various amendments to be made to the model and considered their
impact. One such area of improvement is the memory structure used to represent
the target list. Currently the model uses a simple feature to mark items as belonging
to the same list but does not have the means for relating different lists. While this
makes it impossible for the current model to make intrusion errors, the groundwork
for developing this capability in the future lies in the way it implements same-list
transposition errors now. I have outlined how the existing episodic similarity function
could be generalized to higher-order structures (e.g., separate lists, clusters within
those lists, or even the experiment itself). Just as the episodic selectivity parameter (η)
controls the migration of items within a list, additional similarity strength parameters
would constrain errors between elements of the episodic network.
I outlined issues with the model’s current method of procedural learning with
respect to the speed-accuracy tradeoff observed in human data. It is not clear from
the data available whether learning the tradeoff continues after training, but the
model predicts that for such learning to occur then some form of feedback, whether
self-generated or experimenter-provided, is required. If subjects employ the same
metacognitive strategy as the model, then they incur extraneous cognitive load. Spans
should increase if this cognitive load is reduced by external feedback. However, if
people do not use this strategy, then when feedback is not provided by the experimenter
(as in Barrouillet et al., 2007) the model predicts no improvement in performance in
the distractor task following training.
Although I did not include the fan mechanism in the model because it has been
proposed to effectuate capacity-sharing (Anderson et al., 1996), which is antithetical
to TBRS, I have discussed how it is a prominent element of associative memory. It
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should be reintroduced to the model in the future to reflect the diminishing predictive
ability of an increasing number of associations (Anderson, 2007) rather than as a way
to explain limited WMC. That being said, the model suggests that fan may benefit
WM as a way to balance the differential effect of inhibition, as the reward and penalty
of each, respectively, decreases with set size.
A speculation that follows from this model is that a hard division between working
memory (or short-term memory) and long-term memory may not be necessary. The
model fits human data using the same mechanism (retrieval) to enact attentional
refreshing and LTM access. The model is not evidence against such a separation, but
it does suggest that a unitary model of declarative memory is possible. This avenue
merits further exploration.

6.7

General Impact
In TBRS-related research, cognitive load is carefully controlled in order to measure

its effect on WMC. Now that this link has been established, one may wish to study
the effect of cognitive load on more macro level tasks since WM has been shown to
predict performance in a variety of domain-general, high-level behavior (Conway et
al., 2005). Outside of the lab, real-world work activities require extended, complex
processing. Computational modeling allows for the quantification of the cognitive
load of these activities in a way that traditional cognitive work analysis cannot. By
tracking buffer usage over time, extreme peaks and troughs in cognitive load can be
determined and used to identify choke points in work processes. This entirely new
approach to work analysis may be used to more efficiently organize job procedures.
The broader contribution of my model to the ACT-R theory is to recommend a
best practice for formulating WM within the architecture. While the model itself is
fairly complex, the actual maintenance component is relatively simple. The refreshing
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loop in my model is a special case of a general mechanism. All ACT-R models could
incorporate this implementation of WM by including base-level inhibition and one
production that makes a generic retrieval request any time the central bottleneck is
free.
Moreover, this general mechanism could have an exceptional impact on models
of goal-directed behavior. The maintenance and setting of goals within WM can be
modeled by using spreading activation to allow buffer contexts, such as the goal buffer,
to influence what is retrieved by the general WM loop (perhaps in cooperation with
dynamic pattern matching, which allows productions to be variabilized based on buffer
contents). One example where this would be helpful is in Salvucci and Taatgen’s (2008)
model of threaded cognition, which accounts for concurrent multitasking behavior by
expanding ACT-R’s goal buffer to hold multiple goal chunks. Representing different
task threads, these goal chunks are acted upon serially, similar to how a list of
to-be-remembered items is rehearsed one at a time in a serial memory task. It is
a reasonable hypothesis that such goals are maintained by WM, and a generalized
version of the mechanism in my model could be used to implement this without
modifying a core assumption of the ACT-R architecture (that buffers may only hold
one chunk).
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7

Concluding Remarks

I have provided model-based support for the TBRS theory beyond that of existing
computational implementations such as TBRS* by formalizing both maintenance and
processing roles of WM. My model generates the qualitative patterns of behavior
observed in human data, establishing evidence for the model’s core assumptions.
Imperfect quantitative fits suggest further exploration of certain ancillary assumptions
is needed. Prominent among these is the structure and representation of declarative
memory. While I proposed a novel combination of existing theories of serial memory
that I believe best integrates ACT-R mechanisms with contemporary findings, additional
data is required to definitively assess this approach. I determined that distractor-response
strategy, typically thought to be irrelevant to WM, has a serious impact on cognitive
load and therefore WMC. Although the TBRS theory has thus far left response
processing underspecified, this area must be investigated before computational modeling
of WM can advance. My model provides the means for predicting results in novel
empirical paradigms and for evaluating the cognitive demand of real-world tasks.
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